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AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL
STATUS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
CHEROKEES
BEN OSHEL BRIDGERSt
The Cherokee Indians of North Carolina havefought many battles
in their struggle for survival and legal recognition. They have endured
constantly changing Indian policies of both the federal and the state
governments. In this Article, Mr. Bridgers, Tribal Attorney for the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, attempts to clarify thepresent legal
status of the Cherokees by presenting a chronological analysis of the
historical and legal developments affecting this Indian tribe. Through-
out a muddle of inconsistent court decisions, as well asfederal and state
statutes, Mr. Bridgers traces the issue of the jurisdictional authority of
North Carolina over these Indians. He argues, contrary to theposition
of the North Carolina courts, that the federal government has pre-
empted authority over the Cherokees and that the general princip/es of
federal Indian law should be applied to the North Carolina Cherokees.
As this Article went to print, the Fourth Circuit accepted Mr.
Bridgers' argument and held that North Carolina could not constitu-
tionally tax the income earned on the Cherokee Reservation by mem-
bers of the Band residing on the Reservation. The court also held that a
county could not tax the Cherokees' personal property located on the
Reservation. #4
INTRODUCTION
As Chief Justice John Marshall remarked in one of his landmark
opinions, "The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States
is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence."1 The
uniqueness of this relationship has not been altered significantly in the
nearly 150 years since Marshall's observation.
Of all the Indian tribes encountered by the white settlers, none has
been more persistent in its struggle for existence and legal recognition
than the Cherokees of North Carolina. These Indians, now known as
t Member, Holt, Haire & Bridgers, Sylva, N.C.; Tribal Attorney for Eastern Band of Cher-
okee Indians; B.A. 1961, Hendrix College; M.A. 1962, University of Arkansas; J.D. 1970, Univer-
sity of North Carolina.
# Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, No. 79-1588 (4th Cir., filed Oct. 10, 1980).
Mr. Bridgers argued the case for the Eastern Band. For a complete discussion of this case and its
implications, see note 290 infra.
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
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the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, are comprised of descendants of
approximately 1000 Cherokees who refused to leave their homeland in
the Smoky Mountains of North Carolina during the removal in 1838 to
the Indian Territory west of the Mississippi River. 2 The Cherokees
who remained did so after all their land had been taken pursuant to a
treaty with the federal government 3 and despite great pressure by both
the federal and state governments to move them to the west.4 Pressure
for their removal did not abate until after the turn of the present cen-
tury.5 In the meantime, these Cherokees patiently sought to achieve a
legal status that would enable them to live their own way of life in their
aboriginal homeland.
In their attempt to gain a settled legal status, the Cherokees have
been plagued by an inconsistent line of -federal and state statutes and
court decisions, and. a vacillating Indian policy of the federal govern-
ment. There has been confusion over who should control these Indi-
ans-the federal government, the state government, or the Tribe itself.
In spite of a score of congressional acts and some forty court decisions
specifically dealing with the North Carolina Cherokees, this important
legal question remains unanswered: What is the jurisdictional author-
ity of the State of North Carolina over the Cherokee Indians residing
on the Cherokee Indian Reservation?
Surprisingly, considering the volume of litigation involving these
Indians, no court or legal commentator has ever examined this question
in depth. The courts have accepted earlier cases as determining juris-
dictional questions for all time.6 But close scrutiny of the cases raises
serious doubts whether the courts have always reached the proper con-
clusions, or whether they even have used the proper legal analysis. By
applying well-established principles of federal Indian law to the North
Carolina Cherokees, the federal government appears to have pre-
empted supervisory duties and jurisdiction over the Cherokees. Except
for those matters specifically designated to North Carolina by Congress
in special Cherokee legislation or in general Indian legislation, the
State presently is without proper authority to impose its laws and regu-
lations on these Reservation Indians and is without legal basis to en-
force them against the Cherokees in state courts.
2. See text accompanying notes 75-80, 119-124 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 75-77 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 79-80, 121-122 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 157-162 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 344-432 infra.
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I. THE TREATY PERIOD (1785-1835)
A. The Treaties
During the eighteenth century the Cherokees inhabited land over
parts of what are now eight states.7 These lands bordered the original
colonies and were in the direct path of the western expansion of white
settlers. During the colonial period between 1721 and 1783 the Chero-
kee nation entered into ten separate treaties with the various colonies. 8
These colonial transactions were called treaties, but really were only
concessions forced upon the native Cherokees, who resisted each in
turn only to finally sign under protest after being given solemn assur-
ances that no further demands would be made.9 This pattern was to be
repeated after the colonies revolted against Great Britain.
The first treaty between the United States government and the
Cherokees was the Treaty of Hopewell, executed in South Carolina in
1785.10 This treaty fixed boundaries for the Indian country, withdrew
the protection of the United States from settlers on Indian lands who
would not leave within six months, made arrangements for the punish-
ment of criminals, and declared in solemn tones, "the hatchet shall be
forever buried."" North Carolina, however, lodged a formal protest
with Congress over the treaty because it established a boundary line
with the Indians without regard to the interests of the state.' 2 North
Carolina did not recognize the treaty, and militant frontiersmen along
the lower Tennessee River encroached upon Indian territory.' 3 The
treaty was openly violated, leading Secretary of War Henry Knox to
observe that it "amount[s] to an actual although informal war of the
said white inhabitants against the said Cherokees."' 4 At Knox's re-
7. Those states are North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Ken-
tucky, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Royce, The Cherokee Nation of Indians, in BUREAU OF
ETHNOLOGY, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE 1883-
84, at 140-42 (J. Powell ed. 1887) [hereinafter cited as Royce].
8. These treaties are listed and the cession described in Royce, supra note 7, at 130, as
follows: Treaty of 1721 with South Carolina; Treaty of November 24, 1755, with South Carolina;
Treaty of October 14, 1768, with the British Superintendent of Indian Affairs; Treaty of October
18, 1770, with South Carolina; Treaty of 1772 with Virginia; Treaty of June 1, 1773, with British
Superintendent of Indian Affairs; Treaty of March 17, 1775, Henderson Purchase; Treaty of May
20, 1777, with South Carolina and Georgia; Treaty of July 20, 1777, with Virginia and North
Carolina; Treaty of May 31, 1783, with Georgia.
9. See generally Royce, supra note 7, at 144-51.
10. Treaty of Hopewell, November 28, 1785, United States-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 18.
11. Id art. XIII.
12. Royce, supra note 7, at 155.
13. F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 148 (1962).
14. XXXIV JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, 342 (1937 ed.)
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quest, Congress issued a proclamation directing the Secretary of War to
have troops ready to disperse the intruders.1 5 But since North Carolina
had not ratified the Constitution, Knox and the President felt it politi-
caly expedient to await ratification by the state before enforcing the
treaty.16 By the time North Carolina ratified the Constitution and then
ceded her western lands to the United States, the white settlers were too
entrenched to be peaceably removed.'7 Therefore, the federal govern-
ment asked the Senate for permission to negotiate with the Cherokees
for a new boundary that would include the settlers who had violated
the Hopewell treaty.' 8
In July 1791 the Treaty of Holston' 9 was signed, and the Cherokee
boundary was moved westward. The treaty provided that "[tihe
United States solemnly guarantee to the Cherokee nation, all their
lands not hereby ceded."20 It also declared that "[i]f any citizen of the
United States, or other person not being an Indian, shall settle on any
of the Cherokees' lands, such person shall forfeit the protection of the
United States, and the Cherokees may punish him or not, as they
please."2 '
But even with the new treaty, encroachments by white settlers con-
tinued. In an effort to control the situation, Congress passed an act in
1796 that prohibited settlement of lands beyond the boundary estab-
lished by the Holston Treaty.22 The Act withdrew all support of claims
to land made by unauthorized settlers and authorized the use of mili-
tary force to remove these settlers.23 The Act infuriated the political
leaders of Tennessee, who considered it a direct attack on the State.24
The Tennessee Legislature protested to Congress, attacking both the
Treaty of Holston and the 1796 Act.25 They denied that the Cherokees
even had a right to the land. Governor John Sevier declared the 1796
Act to be an "infamous act," which had "given more umbrage to the
people of this State than any other act ever passed since the indepen-
15. F. PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 148.
16. Id at 149.
17. Id
18. Id
19. July 2, 1791, United States-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 39.
20. Id art. VII.
21. Id art. VIII.
22. Intercourse Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 1, 1 Stat. 469.
23. Id §5.
24. F. PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 152.
25. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 624-25 (1797); F. PRUCHA, supra note
13, at 152-53.
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dency of America."2 6 As a result of the continuing protests of Tennes-
see, President Adams recommended to Congress that still another
treaty be negotiated with the Cherokees. 27
The Cherokees were not willing to surrender more land, and it was
only after a great deal of negotiating that the Treaty of Tellico was
signed in 1798.28 This treaty obtained another cession of land from the
Cherokees to cover the illegal settlers.2 9 The State of Tennessee was
enthusiastic about this treaty because it not only obtained the land
sought by the state, but also forced the federal government to surrender
to its wishes.3" This satisfaction, however, was short lived. The ulti-
mate goal of Tennessee was to remove all Indians from the state.3'
When the Louisiana Purchase added land to the nation in 1803, Ten-
nessee suggested to Congress that it was possible to move all Indians
west of the Mississippi. 3
2
The Cherokees, once again, were pressured for another large ces-
sion of land and road privileges.33 Despite strenuous objections by the
Cherokees, who sent a delegation of prominent chiefs to Washington to
protest further sales of land,34 pressure was brought through the Indian
agent, Colonel Return J. Meigs, until three separate treaties were nego-
tiated in 1804 and 1805.35
The first of these treaties sold land in Georgia that had been set-
tled some years before under the impression that it was outside the
boundaries of the Hopewell Treaty.36 In the other treaties, the United
States purchased a large tract of land in central Tennessee and Ken-
tucky and obtained permission for two mail roads through the Chero-
kee country into Georgia and Alabama.37 The Cherokees received a
26. Letter from Governor Sevier to Tennessee Congressmen (Jan. 22, 1798), reprinted in I R.
WHITE, MESSAGES OF THE GOVERNORS OF TENNESSEE 53 (1952).
27. F. PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 154; Royce, supra note 7, at 176.
28. Treaty of Tellico, October 2, 1798; United States-Cherokee Indians, 7 Stat. 62.
29. Id art. IV.
30. F. PRtJCHA, supra note 13, at 155.
31. Id
32. See I R. WHITE, MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNORS OF TENNESSEE 70, 153-54 (1952).
33. See Royce, supra note 7, at 184.
34. Id at 185.
35. Id at 187.
36. Treaty for Cession of Land in Georgia, October 24, 1804, United States-Cherokee Indi-
ans, 7 Stat. 228.
37. Treaty for Cession of Land and Road Privileges, October 27, 1805, United States-Chero-
kee Indians, 7 Stat. 95; Treaty for Cession of Land and Road Privileges, October 25, 1805, United
States-Cherokee Indians, 7 Stat. 93.
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total of $24,600 in exchange for these benefits.3 8 In spite of these con-
cessions, new immigrants continued to invade Indian lands. In less
than three months a convention was concluded in Washington in which
the Cherokees ceded another 7000 square miles in Tennessee and Ala-
bama.3 9 The Cherokees were promised compensation of $10,000, a
grist mill, a cotton gin, and a life annuity for their aged chief." Be-
cause of some "misunderstandings," these boundaries were extended
still further in a supplementary treaty the following year.4' The treaty
stated that the compensation was $2,000, but the Indian agent secretly
agreed to a "silent consideration" of $1,000 and two rifles for the chiefs
who had signed the treaty.42
Because of the outbreak of hostility with Great Britain and the
Creek Indian War, more than eight years elapsed before another treaty
was entered with the Cherokees. During the Spring of 1816 two trea-
ties were negotiated on the same day in Washington. In the first, the
Cherokees ceded their remaining lands in South Carolina,4 3 and in the
second they agreed to a new boundary line in Alabama in order to
settle the uncertainty caused by the surrender of lands by the Creek
Indians following their uprising against the federal government. 4 The
second agreement also granted free and unrestricted road privileges
throughout the remaining Cherokee country.45 The Cherokees were
pressured during these negotiations to cede more land on either side of
the Tennessee River, but they refused every offer made by the gover-
ment.46 As soon as these treaties were consumated, pressure was at
once begun to bring about a cession in Alabama, with the result that
38. Treaty for Cession of Land and Road Privileges, October 27, 1805, supra note 37, at art,
III; Treaty for Cession of Land and Road Privileges, October 25, 1805, supra note 37, at art, IlI;
Treaty for Cession of Land in Georgia, supra note 36, at art. 2.
39. Convention on Cession of Lands, January 7, 1806, United States-Cherokee Indians, 7
Stat. I01.
40. Id art. II.
41. Elucidation to Convention on Cession of Land, September 11, 1807, United States-Cher-
okee Indians, 7 Stat. 103.
42. Royce, supra note 7, at 197 & n.2.
43. Treaty for Cession of Land in South Carolina, March 22, 1816, United States-Cherokee
Nation, 7 Stat. 138.
44. Convention to Settle Boundary Lines, March 22, 1816, United States-Cherokee Nation, 7
Stat. 139.
45. Id art. II.
46. See Mooney, Myths ofthe Cherokee, in BUREAU OF ETHNOLOOY, NINETEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE, 1897-98, at 98 (J. Powell ed. 1900)
[hereinafter cited as Mooney].
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another treaty was concluded in the fall of 1816.4' For $60,000, plus
$5,000 for abandoned improvements, the Cherokees ceded 3500 square
miles in Alabama, south of the Tennessee River.48
As a result of these various treaties, some Cherokees left their
ceded lands and moved across the Mississippi into what is now Arkan-
sas, becoming known as the Arkansas or Western Cherokees.49 But
they came into conflict with the Osage and Quapaw Tribes, who were
native to that region.5 ° When these Western Cherokees complained to
the federal government, they were told that they originally had been
permitted to remove only if a portion of their eastern territory was
ceded to the government, and "that nothing could be done to protect
them in their new western home until [this] cession had been carried
out."'" Another treaty then was negotiated in Tennessee whereby the
Cherokee nation ceded large tracts in Georgia and Tennessee in ex-
change for a tract assigned to those who had already removed to Ar-
kansas or who would do so in the future. 2 After the treaty, a large
number of Cherokee emigrated to the west, with the total estimated at
6000 by 1819."3
The government continued to bring strong pressure upon the
Cherokees in the east to get them to remove to the west.54 Negotiations
failed, and another delegation was taken to Washington by Indian
Agent Meigs. 5 There the persuasion continued until the chiefs, tired
and discouraged, agreed "to a large cession, which was represented as
necessary. . . to compensate in area for the tract assigned to the emi-
grant Cherokee[s] in Arkansas in accordance with the previous
treaty." 56 This new convention5 7 recited that the majority of the East-
ern Cherokees desired to remain in the east, and that in order to take
"necessary measures for the civilization and preservation of their na-
tion, and to settle the differences arising out of the treaty of 1817," they
47. Treaty with the Cherokees, September 14, 1816, United States-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat.
148.
48. Id art. III.
49. See Mooney, supra note 46, at 102; Royce, supra note 7, at 216.
50. See Mooney, supra note 46, at 102; Royce, supra note 7, at 216.
51. Mooney, supra note 46, at 102.
52. Treaty for Cession of Land in Georgia and Tennessee, July 8, 1817, United States-Chero-
kee Indians, 7 Stat. 156.
53. Royce, supra note 7, at 225.
54. See Mooney, supra note 46, at 106; Royce, supra note 7, at 224-27.
55. See Mooney, supra note 46, at 106; Royce, supra note 7, at 224-27.
56. Mooney, supra note 46, at 106.
57. Convention on Cession of Land, Feb. 27, 1819, United States-Cherokee Indians, 7 Stat.
195.
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"offered to cede to the United States a tract.. 'at least as extensive'
as that to which the Government [was] entitled under the last treaty."58
Individual reservations "were allowed to a number of families who de-
cided to remain among the whites rather than abandon their homes." 59
The treaty was "declared to be a final adjustment to all claims and
differences arising [out of] the treaty of 1817. "60
By the 1820's the Cherokee nation was centered in Georgia where
the Cherokee people had made great political and cultural progress. 6'
Following the invention of a syllabary for the Cherokee language by
Sequoyah, the Cherokees set up a printing press and published their
own newspaper.62 A constitution and a republican form of govern-
ment, both patterned after that of the United States, were adopted.63
The Cherokee nation was divided into eight districts, with each district
furnishing four representatives to the legislature in New Echota.64
Their principal leader was entitled the President of the National Coun-
cil. 65 The legislature made it "treason, punishable [by] death, for any
individual to negotiate the sale of [Indian] lands to the whites without
the consent of the national council."6
6
But the prosperity of the Cherokees vanished when gold was dis-
covered on the Cherokee lands in Georgia.67 The Georgia Legislature
passed a law that annexed all Cherokee lands within the state, declared
all Cherokee laws and customs null and void, and prohibited anyone of
Indian blood from being a witness in a lawsuit if the defendant was
white. 8 The Cherokee land was mapped off and sold at public lottery
to white citizens.6 1 "[T]he Cherokees were forbidden to hold councils,
to assemble for any public purpose, or to dig for gold upon their own
lands."7 All contracts between an Indian and a white were voided un-
less witnessed by two white men.7'
58. Mooney, supra note 46, at 106; Convention, supra note 57, preamble.
59. Mooney, supra note 46, at 106; Convention, supra note 57, art. 3.
60. Mooney, supra note 46, at 106; Convention, supra note 57, preamble.
61. See generally Mooney, supra note 46, at 106-12.
62. Id at 111.
63. Id at 106, 112.
64. Id at 106-07.
65. Id at 107.
66. Id
67. See generally id at 116.
68. See id at 117; Royce, supra note 7, at 260-6 1.
69. See Mooney, supra note 46, at 117.
70. Id
71. Id
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The Georgia legislation was designed "to render life ... intolera-
ble [for] the Cherokee[s] by depriving them of all legal protection.
Bands of armed men invaded the Cherokee country, forcibly seizing
horses and cattle, [ejecting families from their homes], and assaulting
the owners who dared [resist]."72 Upon appeal to President Jackson,
the Cherokees were told that the federal government would not protect
them.73 Legal and political redress denied them,74 the Cherokees were
easy prey for a final treaty.
In December 1835 the Reverend J.F. Schermerhorn, the commis-
sioner appointed to arrange a treaty, met in New Echota with repre-
sentatives of the Cherokees." The resulting Treaty of New Echota
ceded to the United States all of the remaining Cherokee territory east
of the Mississippi in exchange for $5,000,000 and a common interest in
the land already occupied by the Western Cherokees beyond the Mis-
sissippi." The Cherokees were to be removed from the ceded territory
at government expense within two years of ratification of the treaty.77
"Every Cherokee was thus made a landless alien in his original coun-
try."
78
After the treaty was executed, the pressure to remove the Cher-
okees included a declaration from the Governor of Georgia that "if
trouble came from any protection afforded by the government troops to
the Cherokee[s], a direct collision [would occur] between the. . . state
and [federal] government." 79 Thus, the final removal of the Cherokees
and the validity of the Treaty of New Echota-a document not signed
by any officer of the Cherokee nation's government-were "considered
not simply ...Indian question[s], but [rather] issue[s] between state
rights on the one hand and federal jurisdiction and the Constitution on
72. Id at 118.
73. Id at 119.
74. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). See also Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, andMoral-
ity, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1968-69).
75. See Mooney, supra note 46, at 123.
76. Treaty of New Echota, December 29, 1835, United States-Cherokee Indians, arts. 1, 2, 7
Stat. 478.
77. Id art. 8. One provision of the treaty allowed a limited number of Cherokees, "qualified
or calculated to become useful citizens," to remain in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama.
Id art. 12. This provision, however, was stricken from the treaty at the direction of President
Jackson. Supplementary Articles to Treaty of New Echota, March 1, 1836, United States-Chero-
kee Indians, 7 Stat. 488.
78. Mooney, supra note 46; at 159.
79. Mooney, supra note 46, at 129; Royce, supra note 7, at 290.
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the other."8
The accumulative effect of this series of treaties was the complete
surrender of all the land occupied by the Cherokees east of the Missis-
sippi River. The Cherokees were physically removed to the west where
they would be out of harm's way. No provision was made for those
who refused to leave and who hid out in the coves and mountains of
western North Carolina.
B. Case Law During The Treaty Period
During this period the courts were presented with two major
problems: they were called upon to decide title disputes over Indian
land settled by whites and to determine the authority of the state over
Indians living within their boundaries.
The land cases8 t arose when settlers and speculators competed for
the valuable lands opened for settlement. The courts generally deter-
mined superior title by construing the appropriate Indian treaties and
state statutes dealing with settlement of Indian lands.8 2 The cases rec-
ognized the right of the Indians to be on their land and to sell or cede it
to the white man. The courts also acknowledged that because of the
Constitution, only the federal government could make treaties with the
Indians and obtain title to their lands.
The right of Indians to hold land within North Carolina by virtue
of a federal treaty was recognized in Eu-che-la v. Welsh. 3 In Eu-che-la
a Cherokee claimed title to 640 acres reserved for the Cherokee nation
under the treaties of 1817 and 1819.84 The court discussed Indian pol-
icy in colonial times in detail and described the nature of Indian title
under the doctrine of "discovery," explaining that "the ultimate domin-
ion of newly discovered countries not known to christian people, be-
80. Mooney, supra note 46, at 129.
81. See Preston v. Browder, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 115 (1816); Belk v. Love, 18 N.C. (I Dev. &
Bat. Eq.) 65 (1834); Eu-che-la v. Welsh, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 155 (1824); Strother v. Cathey, 5 N.C.
(1 Mur.) 162 (1807).
82. In Strouther v. Cathey, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 162 (1807), the court determined superior title in
an ejectment action by construing a 1783 legislative act together with a 1791 treaty. In the process,
the court recognized that Indians had a right to their lands until they were extinguished by a treaty
with the federal government. See id at 167-68.
In Preston v. Browder, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 115 (1816), the Supreme Court used this same type
of analysis to settle a dispute over land within an area ceded to the U.S. in 1789. One party
claimed title through a 1793 grant from North Carolina while the other party claimed through an
1810 grant from Tennessee. The Court ruled that the earlier entry and grant from North Carolina
was invalid because entry had then been prohibited by a North Carolina statute. Id at 123.
83. 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 155 (1824).
84. Id at 155.
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long to the discoverer."85 The Indians were considered to have only a
"temporary right of occupancy" 86 so that "[t]he only obligation which
justice imposes upon other nations, is, that they leave the natives a suf-
ficiency of land."87 In these early land cases the courts generally traced
the appropriate statutes and treaties in detail and interpreted them in
light of the nature of this original Indian title-less than a fee and lim-
ited to a mere "occupancy." In Eu-che-la the court reached the rare
conclusion that even though the Indian held no specific grant from the
State, his title derived from a treaty that provided for a "reservation,"
and the inferior Indian title was thus converted to a fee ownership by a
1783 North Carolina statute.88
These land cases were decided by applying general principles of
Anglo-American property law. As a by-product, the language of these
decisions tended to support the alienability of Indian lands, whether it
was by state grant or by mesne conveyance from individual Indian
"reservations" claimed under specific treaties.8 9
When the courts turned their attention to the jurisdiction of a state
to impose its authority upon Indians living within its borders, philo-
sophical problems arose that still have not been resolved completely.
The federal courts, guided by the constitutional theories of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, espoused the position that the federal government had
sole authority over the Indians.90 State courts, as exemplified by the
Tennessee court in State v. Foreman,9 assumed a political position
contrary to Marshall-that a state had full sovereignty and authority
over all people within its borders, including Indians.92
The question of state jurisdiction over the Cherokees first arose in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.93 In this famous case the Cherokees peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for an injunction prohibiting Georgia from
imposing its laws in Cherokee territory. The Cherokees claimed to be
85. Id at 159.
86. Id
87. Id at 161.
88. See id at 163, 165.
89. For example in Belk v. Love, 18 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 65 (1834), the court ruled in
favor of a speculator who obtained land from a Cherokee. The Indian had claimed land under a
treaty "reservation," and the court ruled that he had obtained a fee. Id at 73. The treaty was
interpreted as not requiring perpetual residence by the Indians on the reserved lands, and the
lands were held alienable by the Indians in spite of North Carolina statutes prohibiting the
purchase of reserved lands. Id at 74-75.
90. See text accompanying notes 97-105 infra.
91. 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 256 (1835).
92. See text accompanying notes 97-105 infra.
93. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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"'a foreign state, not owing allegiance to the United States, nor to any
state of this union, nor to any prince, potentate or state, other than our
own.' "94 The Court denied relief to the Cherokees, saying it was with-
out jurisdiction to hear the case.95 Chief Justice Marshall found that
the Cherokees were not a foreign nation, but could "more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. ''96
The following year, however, the Court reached the merits of this
issue in Worcester v. Georgia.97 In his opinion Chief Justice Marshall
discussed the doctrine of "discovery."9" Marshall not only stated and
applied the doctrine, but he also analyzed it and described its limita-
tions. The doctrine itself was "'that discovery gave title to the govern-
ment by whose subjects or by whose authority it was made, against all
other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.' "99 According to Marshall, the doctrine did not establish
particular rights over the Indians."o He thought it ridiculous that mere
discovery would convey rights over the natives and observed that the
authority derived by the various colonies from their original Crown
grants was superior only to those of other European white men. 10'
Marshall recognized that tribes "had always been considered as dis-
tinct, independent political communities,"'' t0 and that "the settled doc-
trine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its
independence-its right to self-government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection."' 13 The result of this philosophical
analysis of the political and legal powers of the white man over the
Indian was Marshall's holding that the states did not have jurisdiction
over the Indian people and their own government.' n He noted:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees them-
selves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.
94. Id at 3.
95. Id at 20.
96. Id at 17.
97. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
98. Id at 542-46.
99. Id at 543-44 (quoting Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823)).
100. Id at 544.
101. "[T]hese grants asserted a title against Europeans only, and were considered as blank
paper so far as the rights of the natives were concerned." Id at 546.
102. Id at 559.
103. Id at 560-61.
104. See id at 560-62.
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The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is,
by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United
States.'O
In contrast to this holding, the Tennessee Supreme Court three
years later, in State v. Foreman,0 6 thumbed its judicial nose at Mar-
shall and the federal courts. In 1833 Tennessee had extended a part of
her criminal laws over Indian lands. Foreman argued that the state law
violated the Constitution, but the court held otherwise.10 7 In an ex-
hausting opinion of 81 pages, Judge Catron represented the archetypi-
cal state court, raging against federalism. With great prolixity, Judge
Catron reviewed "our rights" under the doctrine of "discovery."108
The land could not belong to the Indian, he reasoned, because he was
not using all of it. '19 The "laws of nature" justified denying the Indian
dominion over the American continent. 10 The subjugation of the In-
dian was foretold and inevitable,"' and the practical nature of the
frontier provided the court with its basis for the decision." 2
In a concurring opinion, Judge Green pointed out that some lands
had been "acquired by conquest" from Indian tribes, but that this was
not true with the Cherokees." 3 He found that state authority over the
Cherokees was derived not from the law of conquest, but rather from
the law of necessity.' 1'
Only the dissenting opinion of Judge Peck adopted the Marshall
view. He deemed the matter foreclosed because the federal govern-
ment had spoken for the Cherokees in various treaties, and the state
was without power to violate these solemn guarantees.' 15 Treaties, af-
ter all, were the supreme law of the land with regard to Indians." 6
Judge Peck regarded the arguments of the majority as "rather political
than legal""' 7 and replied in ringing words:
The first obligation of every man is to observe and regard the Consti-
tution; with the judge it is emphatically so. The tyrant's plea, that of
105. Id at 561.
106. 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 256 (1835).
107. Id at 336.
108. Id at 264.
109. Id at 266-67.
110. Id at 266.
111. See id at 270-7 1.
112. See id at 319.
113. Id at 344.
114. See id at 348-49.
115. See id at 354-70 (Peck, J., dissenting).
116. See id at 357, 362 (Peck, J., dissenting).
117. Id at 364 (Peck, J., dissenting).
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necessity, wherever advanced, should be watched with caution. If I
ever knew the fact of existing necessity, to which of the mandates
shall I confine myself? It is said, to the act of [the] assembly. My
answer is that between conflicting mandates the treaty is the highest,
and the act, being subordinate, must yield; and certainly it becomes
the stronger when consistent with the fact.
The example of other states are quoted to me. It is urged that Ala-
bama, Georgia, and North Carolina have severally passed such laws,
and the judges of those states will enforce them. My answer is that I
will not sin if others do."
8
II. THE REMOVAL PERIOD (1836-1840)
After the Senate ratified the Treaty of New Echota, the Cherokee
leaders continued to oppose it and tried to change its terms) '9 "Coun-
cils were held in opposition all over the Cherokee nation," and resolu-
tions were prepared and submitted to Washington "denouncing the
methods used [in negotiating the treaty] and declaring [it] null and
void."'2z But President Jackson declared that he was determined to
carry out the treaty without modification as quickly as possible and
ordered that he hear no more, verbally or in writing, about the
treaty.12  He also directed the Cherokees not to assemble in council to
discuss the treaty further. 122 Nevertheless, the Cherokees still hoped to
stop the implementation of the treaty. Speeches in Congress were bit-
ter, with Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, Edward Everett, and Davey
Crockett adamantly opposing the President. 2 3 But in spite of all their
endeavors to secure a modification of the terms of the treaty, it was
carried out.
The last emigrant Cherokees left for the west in December of 1838,
leaving behind perhaps a thousand or so hiding in the coves and moun-
tains of western North Carolina.' 24 General Winfield Scott found it
impractical to capture these straggling groups, so he agreed to let them
remain until their case could be handled by the government.12 5
It was at this point that the Eastern Cherokees began their struggle
for existence and recognition. They were able to survive and ultimately
118. Id at 365 (Peck, J., dissenting).
119. See generally Mooney, supra note 46, at 125-26; Royce, stqra note 7, at 288-91.
120. Mooney, supra note 46, at 126.
121. Id
122. Id
123. See Mooney, supra note 46, at 128-29; Royce, supra note 7, at 287-91.
124. See Mooney, supra note 46, at 157, 159.
125. Id
1088 [Vol. 58
CHEROKEE HISTORICAL ANAL YSIS
persevere largely due to the efforts of one white man, William Holland
Thomas. 2 6 Between 1836 and 1842 Thomas worked on behalf of the
Cherokees who remained in North Carolina. During visits to Wash-
ington he sought official permission for the Cherokees to remain in
North Carolina and for them to receive their share of money due from
improvements and confiscated reservations under the treaties. 127 He
also petitioned the North Carolina General Assembly in 1836 for pas-
sage of an act protecting the Cherokees and recognizing their right to
remain in the state.'2 8
With the remaining North Carolina Indian lands now open, white
settlers rushed into every part of the new territory, taking out grants
and building houses. In the westernmost part of the state, where the
remaining Cherokee lands had been ceded, a new county, Cherokee
County, was formed in 1839.29 A trading post grew on the site of Fort
Butler, which had been erected for the Cherokee removal, and the first
court was held at Fort Butler on March 19, 1839.13' Within two years a
permanent courthouse was built.' 3 1
III. THE POST-REMOVAL PERIOD (1840-1865)
After removal of the Cherokees and settlement of their former
lands, the pressures of the anti-Indian policies of the 1830's subsided.
With the continued efforts of William Thomas, the North Carolina
Cherokees obtained slight concessions from the state and federal gov-
ernments and managed to avoid removal to the west with the other
Cherokees. 32 Thomas also bought land from whites in his own name
for the Cherokees until 1861.133 During this period he was recognized
as the agent for the Cherokee people, and he used money from individ-
126. Thomas, who was born near Waynesville, North Carolina, in 1805, had been adopted by
the Cherokee Chief, Yonaguska (Drowning Bear). Thomas was a student of law and, having
grown up with the Cherokees, he spoke the Cherokee language fluently and had earned their trust
and respect. See generally Mooney, supra note 46, at 160.
127. See id at 159.
128. Id In 1837 the General Assembly did pass an act creating a special Cherokee statute of
frauds. The Act provided that all contracts and agreements with any Cherokee Indian shall be
null and void unless signed in writing by the Indian and witnessed by two other persons. Act of
Jan. 21, 1837, ch. 8, 1836-37 N.C. Pub. Laws 30. This Act is now codified as N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 22-3 (1965).
129. 0. BLACKMUN, WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA: ITS MOUNTAINS AND ITS PEOPLE TO 1880,
at 265 (1977).
130. Id at 274-75.
131. Id at 275.
132. See Mooney, supra note 46, at 157-59.
133. Id at 159.
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ual Cherokees, along with such of their funds as he could obtain from
Washington, to purchase various tracts of land.1 34 These tracts now
constitute the Cherokee Indian Reservation.
35
In 1848 Congress passed an act "for the purpose of paying the cur-
rent and contingent expenses of the Indian department, and fulfilling
treaty stipulations with the various Indian tribes." 136 The Act directed
the Secretary of War to ascertain "the number and names of such indi-
viduals and families. . . that remained in the State of North Carolina
at the time of the ratification of the treaty of New Echota" in order that
the sum of $53.33 might be set aside by the Secretary of the Treasury
for each individual. 37 This money was to be held and distributed to
the individuals when they removed to join the tribe west of the Missis-
sippi.'38 But when the North Carolina Cherokees again refused to emi-
grate, Congress, in 1855, authorized payment to them of the money
appropriated in 1848, provided "the State of North Carolina ha[d]...
by some appropriate act, agreed that said Cherokees may remain per-
manently in that State, anything in the treaty of [1835] to the contrary
notwithstanding."' 139 Further action by either the federal or state gov-
ernments awaited the end of the Civil War, during which the Cher-
okees actively supported the Confederate cause. 140
134. Id
135. During this period the Cherokees lived by themselves and were content with reestablish-
ing their own settlement. In the spring of 1848 the author Lanman visited the Cherokees, staying
several days with Thomas. See C. LANMAN, LETTERS FROM THE ALLEGHANY MOUNTAINS 85
(1849). He was very impressed with what he saw, and wrote:
They have their own courts and try their criminals by a regular jury. Their judges and
lawyers are choosen from among themselves. They keep in order the public roads lead-
ing through their settlement. By a law of the State they have a right to vote, but seldom
exercise that right, as they do not like the idea of being identified with any of the political
parties.
Id at 95.
136. Act of July 29, 1848, ch. 118, 9 Stat. 252.
137. Id § 4.
138. Id § 5.
139. Act of March 3, 1855, ch. 204, § 3, 10 Stat. 1686.
140. See Royce, supra note 7, at 328. During this period the North Carolina courts again were
involved in deciding land disputes over former Indian lands. See Welch v. Trotter, 53 N.C. (8
Jones) 197 (1860); Harshaw v. Taylor, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 513 (1856); Lovinggood v. Burgess, 44
N.C. (Busb.) 407 (1853); Stanmire v. Powell, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 312 (1852); Sutton v. Moore, 25
N.C. (3 Ired.) 66 (1842); Deaver v. Parker, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 40 (1841). See also Lattimer v.
Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4 (1840), in which the United States Supreme Court followed the North
Carolina federal district court in ruling on the propriety of settlement by whites and in construing
two treaties and the location of the Indian boundary line.
In Lovingood v. Smith, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 601 (1860), the court permitted the use of the 1837
Cherokee statute of frauds, see note 128 supra, as a defense in a suit brought by one Cherokee
against another over a promissory note. The court found nothing in the statute to limit its applica-
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IV. GROWING RECOGNITION OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA CHEROKEES
.4. Federal Indian Policy and Legal Developments from 1866-1924
To understand and appreciate the evolution of the legal status of
the North Carolina Cherokees during this period, it is necessary to con-
sider legal developments affecting Indians throughout the United
States. Just as the removal of the Cherokees in the 1830's was a result
of the Indian policy of the federal and state governments at that time,
the actions of the federal government affecting the Cherokees in the
late nineteenth century also were influenced by the general Indian pol-
icy of the United States. After the 1830's removal, there was no "In-
dian problem" in the eastern states. But as the frontier gradually
followed the Indians west, the attitude towards Indians hardened
again, and a policy similar to that of the 1830's returned. After the
Civil War, "[t]he East was indifferent to the Indian," and "[t]he West,
as a rule, was openly hostile."''
During the 1850's the federal government experimented in Cali-
fornia with creating "reservations" for various Indian tribes. 142 This
approach appeared to provide a successful method for separating Indi-
ans from the growing white settler population. The concept of concen-
trating Indians within well-defined geographical areas became an
extremely popular Indian policy. As settlement of the West increased
following the Civil War, this "concentration" policy became the ac-
cepted method of dealing with the Indians.' 43
Meanwhile, the federal government continued its legal negotia-
tions with Indian tribes through the treaty process.44 Treaties had pro-
vided a solemn and satisfactory method of negotiating with Indian
tribes in the early colonial years, when the negotiating parties were of
comparable strength. But as the strength of the white civilization in-
creased and as dwindling Indian tribes were pushed further west, the
justification for the cumbersome treaty process disappeared. Neverthe-
less, the federal government continued negotiating treaties after the
tion to contracts between whites and Indians. 52 N.C. (7 Jones) at 602-03. This statute proved to
be the first legal indication of any paternalistic feeling toward the Cherokees by North Carolina.
141. L. SCHMECKERBIER, THE OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 48 (1927).
142. See generally H. FRITZ, THE MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN ASSIMILATION, 1860-1890 (1963);
L. PRIEST, UNCLE SAM'S STEPCHILDREN 121-31 (1942); S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY
70-94 (1973).
143. H. FRITZ, supra note 142; L. PRIEST, supra, note 142 at 121-131; S. TYLER, supra note
142, at 70-94.
144. SeePRIEST, supra note 142, at 95-105.
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Civil War because of serious doubts whether Congress could constitu-
tionally deal with Indian tribes through alternative methods. 45 But
when the Supreme Court ruled in the Cherokee Tobacco Case'46 that
acts of Congress might supersede prior treaties, 1 47 these congressional
doubts were set to rest.
At this time, however, Congress was sharply divided over the
method of determining Indian policy. Ratification of Indian treaties
required only Senate approval.148 The House of Representatives, how-
ever, was responsible for appropriation measures effectuating Indian
policy.149 After a serious impasse, in which the House refused to pass
Indian appropriations for an entire term,' a rider was inserted in the
Indian Appropriation Act of 1871 prohibiting further treaties with In-
dian tribes.' 5 ' Henceforth, dealing with the Indians would be accom-
plished solely through legislation requiring approval of both Houses. 52
Following the Civil War, the federal government sought to retain
control over Indian affairs and not surrender it to the states. After an
1875 recommendation by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that In-
dians be placed under state control, 53 a measure was presented to the
House of Representatives in 1877 authorizing negotiations with several
states, including North Carolina, for the transfer of guardianship over
the Indians.' The proposal was defeated, partly because federal offi-
cials realized that once a state assumed responsibility for Indians, the
federal government would lose its power in that area. 5 5 Consequently,
federal officials opposed state control and often took the issue to court,
where federal authority over Indians was upheld. 56
By the 1880's the "concentration" or "reservation" policy had
145. See authorities cited at note 142 infra.
146. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
147. Id at 621.
148. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
149. See id art. I, § 7, cl. I.
150. SeePRIEST, supra note 142, at 97-98.
151. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §71 (1976)),
152. Adding to this debate was a parallel dispute, which extended from 1867 to 1879, over
whether to transfer control of Indian affairs from the Interior Department to the War Department.
The balance finally was tipped in favor of the Interior Department, where responsibility has re-
mained to the present. SeePRIFST, supra note 142, at 95-105.
153. COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1875); BOARD OF INDIAN
COMMISSIONERS REPORT 15-16 (1875),
154. See H.R. 3593, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 CONG. REC. 1303 (1877); H.R. EXEc. Doc. No.
106, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876).
155. SeePRIEST, supra note 142, at 213-16.
156. For example, the Supreme Court upheld federal control of Indian trade. See United
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failed, and Congress replaced it in 1887 with an "allotment" policy. 15 7
With the General Allotment Act Congress hoped to solve the "Indian
problem" by turning the Indians into farmers. The Act provided for
the division of tribally owned lands into 160 acre "allotments" for each
family head, with the "surplus" available for later sale to non-Indian
settlers.'58 The basic characteristics of an allotment under the Act were
as follows: (1) it was an individual's share of the tribal land; (2) there
were restrictions against alienation to protect the Indian against loss of
his land; and (3) it was a vehicle for the government to educate the
Indian to become a productive citizen.' 59
During the allotment period, which extended to 1934, emphasis
was placed on the Indians as individuals rather than upon the tribes.
An individual Indian allotted land would become a citizen, thereafter
possessing all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of white citi-
zens. 6 0 While in the treaty period the federal government had distrib-
uted supplies, provisions, and "annuities" to the tribal leaders,' 6' after
the Allotment Act supplies and payments were made directly to the
individual Indians.t62 The purpose of the Allotment Act was thus "ul-
timately to dissolve all tribal relations and to place each adult Indian
upon the broad platform of American citizenship." 63 The effect of the
Act, quite naturally, was to destroy traditional Indian tribal govern-
ment. The "government" of most Indian tribes from 1887 to 1934 con-
sisted of the Indian agent and his staff. Thus, the objective of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs was generally to support and civilize the Indi-
ans. 1
6 4
States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 407 (1865).
It was also settled during this period that the admission of new states into the Union did not
divest the federal government of authority over the Indians. See Utah & N. R. v. Fisher, 116 U.S.
28, 29-30 (1885); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623-24 (1881); Langford v. Monteith,
102 U.S. 145, 146-47 (1880); Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 477-78 (1878); The N.Y. Indians, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 767-70 (1866); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 754-57 (1866).
157. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, §§ 1-11, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331
to 358 (1976)).
158. Id §§ 1, 5 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1976)).
159. See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 773-84 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL INDIAN LAW].
160. Act of February 8, 1887; ch. 119; § 6, 24 Stat. 388, (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349
(1976)).
161. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 132, 18 Stat. 420.
162. See text accompanying notes 223-258 infra.
163. COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 153, at viii.
164. See, e.g., Synder Act, ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208 (1921) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 13
(1976)).
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The goal of "civilizing" the Indian also was illustrated in congres-
sional reaction to a controversial Supreme Court decision, Ex pare
Crow Dog.65 An Indian named Crow Dog killed a popular Sioux
chief and was punished according to tribal custom. His punishment,
restitution payments to the family of the victim, outraged non-Indians,
and he was tried and convicted in federal court for murder. On appeal
the Supreme Court ruled that his punishment was in accordance with
tribal custom, and that the federal courts were without jurisdiction to
impose further penalty on him.'16 6 As a result of the public outcry to
this decision, Congress attached a section to an appropriations act that
set forth seven major crimes over which the federal courts thereafter
would exercise jurisdiction in Indian affairs.' 67 In United States v.
Kagama16 8 the Supreme Court upheld this legislation as a valid exer-
cise of federal regulation of Indian behavior16 9 and in the process es-
tablished what has become known as the "plenary power" doctrine. 170
The Court noted that
[t]he power of the General Goverment over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is neces-
sary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom
they dwell. It must exist in that goverment, because it never has ex-
isted anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the
geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.17 1
Also during this period the Supreme Court reaffirmed a rule of
construction for cases involving Indians that is still followed. In Alaska
Pacfic Fisheries v. United States72 the Court observed that "statutes
passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or communities are to
be liberally construed doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of
the Indians."' 173 The plenary powers doctrine, together with this rule of
construction, form the strongest links in the chain of Indian cases
stretching from Worcester to the present.
165. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
166. Id at 568-72.
167. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1976)).
168. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
169. Id at 383-85.
170. id at 379-80, 383-85.
171. Id at 384-85.
172. 248 U.S. 78 (1918). See also Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
173. 248 U.S. at 89.
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B. Cherokee Legislation and Case Law from 1866-1924
After the Civil War the problem of the Cherokees again was ad-
dressed by the governments. In 1866 the North Carolina General As-
sembly, in response to an 1855 Congressional request, 74 legislated that
the Cherokees had the legal right, insofar as the state was concerned, to
continue residing in North Carolina.'7 5 Shortly thereafter, in 1868,
Congress recognized the North Carolina Cherokees for the first time as
legitimate remnants of the Cherokee nation and by statute directed the
Secretary of the Interior "to take the same supervisory charge ... [of
them] as of other tribes of Indians." '176 Nevertheless, no Indian agent
was assigned by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs because Congress
had not appropriated funds for this purpose. 77
The next year, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled there was
"nothing in the Constitution or laws of North Carolina, which forbids
Cherokee Indians [sic] residents from taking and holding land."' 7 8
And in 1870 the court extended the application of North Carolina
criminal laws to Cherokees in State v. Ta-cha-na-tah.'79 The question
of jurisdiction of the state over the Indian defendant was not seriously
questioned. 180
By this time William Thomas was compelled by age and poor
health to "retire from further active participation in the affairs of the
East Cherokee."' 8 ' With his retirement, and "in the absence of any
active governmental supervision" through an Indian agent, the Cher-
okees recognized a need for "some central authority."' 82 In 1868 they
met in Graham County, North Carolina to adopt a constitutional gov-
174. See text accompanying notes 139 supra.
175. Act of Feb. 9, 1866, ch. 54, § 1, 1866 N.C. Pub. Laws, Special Sess., 120.
176. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 259, § 3, 15 Stat. 228.
177. Mooney, supra note 46, at 172.
178. Colvord v. Monroe, 63 N.C. 288, 288-89 (1869).
179. 64 N.C. 614 (1870).
180. Id at 615 (objection not urged by counsel). See also State v. Wolf, 145 N.C. 440, 59 S.E.
40 (1907), in which a Cherokee Indian was convicted of violating a state compulsory school at-
tendance law for not sending his child to the Indian school. The state legislature had enacted a
special bill applying compulsory attendance to the Cherokee Indian school. See id at 441-42, 59
S.E. at 41. Two dissenting justices questioned the appropriateness of the law. Id at 447-449, 59
S.E. at 43-44 (Connor, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Congress previously had authorized
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to establish regulations to enforce attendance of Indian chil-
dren at schools established for their benefit. Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 164, § 1, 27 Stat. 120, 143
(current version at 25 U.S.C. § 282 (1976)). See also 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).
181. Mooney, supra note 46, at 172.
182. Id at 173.
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ernment for the tribe.'8 3 This tribal government was inaugurated on
December 1, 1870.184 The new government "provided for a first and
second chief to serve for two year terms", with one representative from
each Cherokee community to serve at an annual council.'85 In 1875 a
new constitution was adopted, fixing the term of the chief at four
years. 86  ,
By 1870 the status of the lands bought for the Cherokees by
Thomas was in a state of confusion. Following the war, creditors at-
tacked Thomas' personal finances. 87 Because the Cherokee lands were
technically a part of his estate, Thomas having taken title to these lands
in his own name, they passed into the hands of his creditors. 8 8 In or-
der to secure the title and retain possession of the land for the Cher-
okees, Congress authorized a suit to be brought in their name. 8 9 A suit
was filed in 1873, and the next year the dispute was given to three arbi-
trators, whose decision was confirmed in 1874.19' As a result, the Cher-
okees made additional payments to some of the creditors in return for
deeds to the lands purchased for them by Thomas.' 9' To enable the
Cherokees to pay off this lien, "Congress in 1875 directed that as much
as remained of the 'removal and subsistence fund' set apart for their
benefit in 1848 should be used 'in perfecting titles to (their] lands'" and
paying the costs of the litigation. 92 Congress also appropriated
$15,000 to defray the cost of surveying the Cherokee lands. 93 After the
land was surveyed and deeded, "the Indian Office assumed regular su-
pervision of. . . Cherokee affairs and. . . the first agent since the re-
tirement of Thomas was sent" from Washington in June 1875. '94 The
following year Congress authorized the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs to take the lands in satisfaction of the judgment in the law suits
with the land later to be conveyed to the Eastern Band in fee simple.' 95
183. Id
184. Id
185. Id
186. Id
187. Id
188. Id
189. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 296, § 11, 16 Stat. 335.
190. For award of arbitrators and court confirmation, see H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 128, 53d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7-22 (1894).
191. Id
192. Mooney, supra note 46, at 174. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 132, 18 Stat. 420,
193. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 455, 18 Stat. 204.
194. Mooney, supra note 46, at 174.
195. Act of August 14, 1876, ch. 268, 19 Stat. 139.
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During this period, transferring guardianship and control of the
North Carolina Cherokees from the federal to the state government
was seriously considered. In 1876 a bill was referred to the Congres-
sional Committee on Indian Affairs that would transfer responsibility
from the federal government to the states of New York, North Caro-
lina, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa.' 96 The rationale for
the proposed transfer was that tribes in those states, including the East-
ern Cherokees, had "attained to such a degree of civilization as to be-
come self-supporting, and in all other respects fitted to mingle with the
citizens of the States, to be subject to the same municipal control, and
enjoy the same rights and privileges."' 19 7 The bill would have trans-
ferred "control and guardianship" of the several tribes to the states,
including all funds held in trust by the federal government as well as
title to the lands occupied by the tribes.'98 The bill, however, was not
passed, and the federal government retained control.
In 1882 the tribe was involved in a contract action to recover attor-
ney fees for representation of the tribe in the earlier land suits. In Rol-
lins v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians,'99 the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in the first judicial recognition that the Eastern Cher-
okees had any legal status as an Indian tribe, held that the state courts
were without jurisdiction to hear the suit.200 The court ruled that since
the federal government oversaw the activities of the tribe, contracts
with the tribe could not be enforced against them in the state courts
without the consent of the federal government.20 '
During all this time the North Carolina Cherokees had never for-
saken their claims to share in the treaty benefits due the Cherokee Na-
tion. In 1882 a special agent was appointed to investigate their
claims,2 2 and in 1883 Congress gave its approval 203 for a suit to be
brought in the Court of Claims against the United States and the Cher-
okee Nation. Both the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court re-
196. See H.R. 3593, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 CONG. REc. 1303 (1877); H.R. EXEC. Doc. No.
106, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876).
197. H.R. Ex~c. Doc. No. 106, supra note 196, at 2; see alsoJ. KINNEY, A CONTINENT LosT-
A CIVILIZATION WON 178-81 (1937).
198. H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 106, supra note 196, at 2.
199. 87 N.C. 229 (1882).
200. Id at 248.
201. Id at 245-46, 248.
202. Act of August 7, 1882, ch. 433, 22 Stat. 302.
203. Act of March 3, 1883, ch. 14, 22 Stat. 582.
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jected the claims of the North Carolina Cherokees.2 " Both courts
ruled that the Cherokees in North Carolina had dissolved their connec-
tion with the Cherokee Nation and had ceased to be a part of it when
they refused to emigrate west of the Mississippi.20 5 In order for them to
share in the benefits of the treaties, they must rejoin the Cherokee Na-
tion and comply with its constitution and by-laws.2 °6 The Supreme
Court opinion also contained dictum that questioned the legal status of
the North Carolina Indians2 °7 and has since been cited to deny the tri-
bal status of these Cherokees and establish jurisdiction of the state over
the tribe.20 8
"In order to acquire a more definite legal status, '2 9 the Cherokees
obtained a private act of incorporation from the North Carolina legis-
lature in 1889.210 The Act granted the tribe all the powers of a corpora-
tion under the state law21' and validated titles and deeds to the tribe. 1
2
But in 1890 the Cherokee lands were sold for taxes by Swain County,
North Carolina, and Congress once again appropriated funds to re-
deem the land and to pay taxes in subsequent years.2 t3 Furthermore, in
1894 the still unresolved litigation between the tribe and the creditors
of Will Thomas was finally settled by compromise. 214 Congress appro-
204. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 20 Ct. CI. 449 (1885), a7'd, 117 U.S.
288 (1886) (also referred to as the Cherokee Trust Funds Case).
205. 117 U.S. at 309-10; 20 Ct. Cl. at 473-83.
206. Id at 311; 20 Ct. Cl. at 483.
207. The Court said:
The Cherokees in North Carolina dissolved their connection with their Nation when
they refused to accompany the body of it on its removal, and they have had no separate
political organization since. Whatever union they have had among themselves has been
merely a social or business one. It was formed in 1868, at the suggestion of an officer of
the Indian office, for the purpose of enabling them to transact business with the Govern-
ment with greater convenience. Although its articles are drawn in the form of a constitu-
tion for a separate civil government, they have never been recognized as a separate
Nation by the United States; they can pass no laws; they are citizens of that State and
bound by its laws. . . . [T]hey have been in some matters fostered and encouraged by
the United States, but never recognized as a Nation in whole or in part.
Id at 309-10, 20 Ct. Cl. at 473-83.
208. See United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 539
(1932); In re McCoy, 233 F. Supp. 409, 412-13 (E.D.N.C. 1964); State v. McAlhaney, 220 N.C.
387, 389, 17 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1941); State v. Wolf, 145 N.C. 440, 444, 59 S.E. 40, 42 (1907); Sasser
v. Beck, 40 N.C. App. 668, 670, 253 S.E.2d 577, 578-79, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 300, 259 S.E.2d 915
(1979).
209. Mooney, supra note 46, at 177.
210. See Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 211, N.C. Private Laws 889.
211. Id §1.
212. Id § 3.
213. Act of August 4, 1892, ch. 376, 27 Stat. 348.
214. See H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 128, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-46 (1894). The 1874 award had not
settled the claims of the Indian lands as the Cherokees had hoped. According to George H.
Smathers, Special Assistant United States Attorney, "[It was by the carelessness and negligence of
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priated an additional $68,000 to carry out the terms of the award."'
In 1897 the legal status of the Cherokees was enhanced by a deci-
sion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In United States v.
Boyd,21 6 the court said:
The congress of the United States has repeatedly, since the treaty of
New Echota, recognized the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians as a
distinct portion of the Cherokee race, and has dealt with them, not as
individuals, but as a band distinctive in character, dependent on the
United States, and entitled to the aid and protection of the general
government.21 7
With this language the North Carolina Cherokees, for the first time,
were recognized by a federal court as possessing the legal rights and
status of other Indian tribes.21 8
Finally, in 1924, in another attempt to resolve the unsettled status
of the Cherokees, Congress passed an act "[piroviding for the final dis-
position of the affairs of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of
North Carolina."2 9 The Act provided that the Secretary of the Interior
the agents and officials of the United States that the title papers and other written contracts of the
Indians were lost and destroyed." Report from George H. Smathers to Attorney General Richard
Olney (November 25, 1893), reprinted in H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 128, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-
58(1894) at 146.
Following the 1874 award, there were a great number of trespasses onto the Indian land by
whites. This condition was explained by Eugene E. White, United States Special Indian Agent in
his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in December, 1885 (reprinted in id at 46-58):
To comprehend . . . [how title to the Cherokee lands became confused] it is neces-
sary to know that the State of North Carolina never diminishes her public domain.
Under her laws she will grant away the same tract or parcel of land times without
number. Any citizens, upon proper application and payment of a specific price, can
obtain a grant for any particular tract or parcel, no matter if the State had parted with
her title to it forty years before. She will issue grants to the same tract or parcel just as
many times and as frequently as proper application is made to her for them. She war-
rants nothing, however, and leaves it to the grantees to contest the "seniority" of their
respective grants between themselves in the courts. Hence, . . . Hyde [the white man
with conflicting claims] manifestly experienced no difficulty in procuring grants from the
State for all the lands he wanted in Qualla Boundary. And so completely did he cover it
and absorb it with grants that my great surprise is that having gone that far he did not go
one step further and bring suits of ejectment against the whole band, and set them adrift
in the world, without whereon to lay their heads.
Id at 48.
215. Act of August 23, 1894, ch. 307, 28 Stat. 424.
216. 83 F. 547 (4th Cir. 1897).
217. Id at 554.
218. The court also had its share of land title disputes during this period. See Brown v.
Smathers, 188 N.C. 166, 126 S.E. 22 (1924); Westfelt v. Adams, 159 N.C. 409, 74 S.E. 1041 (1912);
Frazier v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 146 N.C. 477, 59 S.E. 1005 (1907); Frazier v. Gib-
son, 140 N.C. 272, 52 S.E. 1035 (1905); Brown v. Brown, 103 N.C. 221, 9 S.E. 706 (1889), aj#'don
rehearing, 106 N.C. 45 1, 11 S.E. 647 (1890); Whitsett v. Forehand, 79 N.C. 230 (1878); Colvord v.
Monroe, 63 N.C. 288 (1868). See also Smythe v. Henry, 41 F. 705 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1890).
219. Act of June 4, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-191, ch. 253, 43 Stat. 376.
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would prepare a new roll of the Cherokees,220 and that the tribe would
convey all its land, money, and other property in trust to the United
States.221 The Act further provided that the lands and money of the
tribe would be alloted and divided among its members.222 This Allot-
ment Act placed the Cherokees and their lands on the same footing as
other Indian tribes under the federal Indian policy.
V. TRIBAL STATUS: THE MODERN PERIOD
A. Federal Indian Policy and Legislation Since 1925
While the General Allotment Act was the most significant general
Indian legislation in the late nineteenth century, in the early twentieth
century the most important Indian legislation passed by Congress was
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.223 The publication of the
famous Meriam Report in 1928224 furnished the impetus for the Act.
That study of Indian affairs presented in shocking detail the failure of
federal Indian policy over the previous fifty years under the allotment
policy 225 and recommended many reforms,2 2 6 some of which were car-
ried out in the Indian Reorganization Act.2 27
The purpose of the legislation was "[t]o grant to Indians living
under federal tutelage the freedom to organize for purposes of local
self-government and economic enterprise. 2 28 The Act officially ended
the policy of allotment229 and prohibited any transfer of Indian land
except for voluntary exchanges for land of equal value when approved
220. Id § 2.
221. Id preamble.
222. Id § 8. After the conveyance of the Cherokee land in trust to the United States, the
federal policy of granting allotments eventually was discontinued. In 1931 Congress amended the
1924 Act and directed the Secretary of the Interior to defer the allotments of the Cherokee lands
until otherwise directed by Congress. Act of March 4, 1931, Pub. L. No. 71-841, ch. 494, 46 Stat.
1518. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 permanently deferred allotments of any Indian trust
lands to individual tribal members. See text accompanying notes 223-232 infra.
223. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (current version at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976). See Comment, Tribal Self-Goyernment and the Indian Reorganization
Act of1934, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 955 (1972).
224. INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION, THE PROBLEM
OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928) [hereinafter referred to as MERIAM REPORT].
225. The allotment system had resulted in the loss of 90,000,000 acres of land by the Indians
since 1887. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
226. See, e.g., MERIAM REPORT, supra note 224, at 113, 140-54, 462, 629-45,
227. See, e.g., Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, § 17, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 477 (1976)).
228. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
229. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1976).
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by the Secretary of the Interior.23 ° It also provided a method for
strengthening the governmental structure of the tribes by adoption of a
Constitution and issuance of a federal corporate charter.23
This legislation, along with the other new federal programs
ushered in with the Roosevelt administration represented a "New
Deal" for Indians. The Indian people were still encouraged to attain
self-sufficiency, but on a more gradual basis and through different
methods.232 But by the end of World War II, federal Indian policy
again changed direction. After a series of studies and hearings on the
status of Indian tribes throughout the country, Congress adopted a new
policy known as "termination." '33 This policy, which lasted well into
the 1960's, was based on the hope that by terminating the relationship
between the United States and the Indian tribes and by removing fed-
eral services, the Indians would be free to manage their affairs on their
own, and that they would thereby prosper along with the general popu-
lation.234 Many termination acts were passed by Congress that affected
a number of Indian tribes.235 Nevertheless, most Indian tribes, includ-
ing the North Carolina Cherokees, opposed termination and those who
made their opposition known successfully blocked termination legisla-
tion.236
This termination policy was typified in what is popularly known as
230. Id § 464.
231. Id §§ 476 to 478.
232. See id § 476.
233. See generalI DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 159, at 134-36.
234. Id
235. See Act of Aug. 11, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-419, 78 Stat. 390 (California Rancherias and
Reservations); Act of Sept. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-629, 76 Stat. 429 (current version at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 971 to 980 (1976)) (Ponca Tribe of Native Americans of Nebraska); Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-322, 73 Stat. 592 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 931 to 938 (1976)) (Catawba Indians of
South Carolina); Act of Aug. 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (California Rancherias
and Reservations); Act of Aug. 3, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-943, ch. 909, 70 Stat. 963 (current version
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 841 to 853 (1976)) (Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma); Act of Aug. 2, 1956, Pub. L. No.
84-921, ch. 881, 70 Stat. 937 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 821 to 826 (1976)) (Peoria Tribe of
Oklahoma); Act of Aug. 1, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-887, ch. 843, 70 Stat. 893 (current version at 25
U.S.C. §§ 791 to 807 (1976)) (Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma); Act of Sept. 1, 1954, Pub. L. No.
83-762, ch. 1207, 68 Stat. 1099 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 741 to 760 (1976)) (Paiute Indians
of Utah); Act of Aug. 27, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-671, ch. 1009, 68 Stat. 868 (current version at 25
U.S.C. § 677 (1976)) (Uintah and Ouray Ute Mixed Bloods of Utah); Act of Aug. 13, 1954, Pub. L.
No. 83-588, ch. 733, 68 Stat. 724 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 691 to 708 (1976)) (Western
Oregon Indians--60 bands); Act of Aug. 13, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-587, ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (cur-
rent version at 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1976) (Klamath Tribe of Oregon); Act of June 23, 1954, Pub. L.
No. 83-627, ch. 831, 68 Stat. 768 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 721 to 728 (1976)) (Alabama-
Coushatta Tribes of Texas); Act of June 17, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-399, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (re-
pealed 1973) (Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin).
236. See DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 161-88 (S. Tyler ed.
1973).
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Public Law 280.237 In 1953 Congress attempted to provide a legislative
solution to the increasingly troublesome question of state jurisdiction
over Indians.23 s Public Law 280 grew out of an attempt to confer such
jurisdiction upon California.23 9 Previous grants of jurisdiction from
Congress had been limited to reservations within a single state, and had
followed consultation with the individual tribes and states con-
cerned.2 4 ° Public Law 280, however, was transformed into a general
bill applicable to all states. 241 In the Act Congress authorized certain
states to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indi-
ans.242 Those states were given the same criminal jurisdiction over In-
dian country as they had elsewhere within the state,243 and the Major
Crimes Act2'4 and General Crimes Act 245 were made inapplicable
within the Indian country.24 6 Five states were specifically conferred ju-
237. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976)). See generally Goldberg, Public Law 280.- The Limits of
State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535 (1974-75).
238. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976)).
239. H.R. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 5, reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2409, 2411.
240. See 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1976) (granting New York criminal jurisdiction on reservations); 25
U.S.C. § 233 (1976) (granting New York civil jurisdiction over tribes within the state); Act of Oct.
5, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-322, ch. 604, 63 Stat. 704 (granting California civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion over Agua Calienta Reservation); Act of June 30, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-846, ch. 759, 62 Stat.
1161 (granting Iowa criminal jurisdiction over Sac and Fox Reservation); Act of May 31, 1946,
Pub. L. No. 79-394, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229 (granting North Dakota criminal jurisdiction over Devils
Lake Reservation); Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (repealed 1948) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 3243 (1976)) (granting Kansas criminal jurisidiction over reservations).
241. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976)).
242. Id §§ 2, 4.
243. Id
244. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976).
245. Id § 1152.
246. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) (1976)).
The term "Indian country" was given a statutory definition in 1948. The term has been in
regular use since the eighteenth century. It originally referred to the separate territory set aside for
Indians, and in 1834 was defined as the lands west of the Mississippi and those lands east of the
Mississippi where Indian title had not yet been extinguished. Non-Intercourse Act of 1834, ch.
161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976)). The 1948 Act defined "Indian
country" as "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976). Although this is a criminal statute, the
Supreme Court has ruled that it "generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction."
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
This definition is a direct outgrowth of the Supreme Court's decision in Donnelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913). In Donnelly the defendant argued that the term "Indian country" was
confined to lands in which Indians retained their original right of possession and did not apply to
public land set apart as an Indian reservation, and not previously occupied by Indians. Id at 268.
The Court, however, recognized the changes in Indian affairs had been "so numerous and so
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risdiction over Indians within their borders,247 and consent was given
for additional states to assume civil or criminal jurisdiction.248 To date,
eleven additional states have assumed jurisdiction over Indians.249
North Carolina has taken no action to assume jurisdiction under the
Act.
The Act later was amended when Congress provided in the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 that thereafter no state could obtain jurisdiction
over an Indian tribe through Public Law 280 unless the tribe itself con-
sented to such jurisdiction.2 50  This amendment represented a shift
away from the assimilation approach to one of concern for tribal gov-
ernments.
As a result of disastrous experiences of the tribes terminated in the
1950's, the termination policy was recognized as another failure.
Again, the federal government sought a different approach to deal with
the seemingly endless "Indian problem." In a message to the Senate,
President Lyndon Johnson called on Congress to put an end to the ter-
mination of Indian tribes and to replace that policy with one promoting
"self-determination.1 251 The landmark legislation coinciding with this
new policy was the passage, under the sponsorship of North Carolina's
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act.252 The
Act lists specific protections for individual tribal members as well as
limitations upon tribal governments. 53 Thus, Congress recognized the
attributes of sovereignty and powers of self-government by applying
material, that the term cannot now be confined to land formerly held by the Indians, and to which
their title remains unextinguished." Id at 269. The Court held that "nothing can more appropri-
ately be deemed 'Indian country"' than land "set apart as an Indian reservation." Id
The status of non-reservation Indian lands was settled in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
28 (1913). Sandoval involved lands of the Pueblo Indians that were not federally owned reserva-
tions but were communally held lands owned in fee. The Court held that the lands were "Indian
country" because they were occupied by "distinctly Indian communities" recognized and assisted
by the federal government. Id at 46. The 1948 Act definition contained a codification of Sando-
val. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976).
247. California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub.
L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, §§ 2, 4, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976)).
248. Id §§ 6, 7.
249. Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Utah, and Washington. See Goldberg, supra note 237, at 547.
250. See Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 406, 82 Stat. 80 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1326 (1976)).
251. 114 CONG. REc. 5394, 5395 (1968) (message of President Johnson, The Forgotten Ameri-
can).
252. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-203, 82 Stat. 78, (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301 to 1303 (1976)).
253. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1303 (1976).
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some, but not all, of the Bill of Rights to Indian governments.25 4
The most significant development in federal case law during this
period has been the clear application by the Supreme Court of the prin-
ciples of federal preemption to Indian law. In a twenty year period, the
Court decided ten Indian cases on the basis of federal preemption. 25
The principles relied on by the Court can be traced directly back to
Worcester v. Georgia, which remains the most frequently cited of all
Indian cases.25 6 Under the preemption doctrine, valid federal legisla-
tion enacted for the benefit and protection of Indians preempts state
laws that conflict with the federal legislation.257 In these cases the
Court has adopted a strong presumption against the validity of state
regulations in Indian country.258 In the continuing contest between In-
dian tribes and state and local governments, this doctrine provides the
key for resolving these competing interests.
B. Cherokee Case Law Since 1925
1. Status of Cherokee Land
Following the conveyance of the Cherokee lands to the United
States in 1925,259 a number of cases examined the status of the Cher-
okees and the lands they continued to occupy. Beginning in the 1930's
the Fourth Circuit decided a series of cases involving the Cherokees
that answered a number of questions concerning the status of their
lands. In United States v. Wright,260 officials of Swain County, North
254. Id For additional important Indian social legislation during this period, see, Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 to 450n (1976); Indian Fi-
nancing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976); Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1601 to 1675 (1976); Tribally Controlled Community College Assistance Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1801 to 1815 (Supp. I 1978); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to 1963 (Supp. II
1978); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. II 1978).
255. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S.
373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463 (1976); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Kennerly v. District
Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per curiam); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380
U.S. 685 (1965); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217 (1959).
256. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1973). See
text accompanying notes 97-105 supra.
257. See, eg., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376-77 n.2 (1976); Warren Trading Post
Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690-91 (1965).
258. For example, in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), the
Court ruled that state taxes generally are inapplicable against Indians in Indian country unless
Congress provides to the contrary. Id at 165, 181.
259. See text accompanying notes 219-222 supra.
260. 53 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 539 (1932).
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Carolina, had assessed Cherokee lands .and had sold them for taxes
after the transfer of the -lands to the United States under the 1924 Cher-
okee Allotment Act. In the suit the court was asked to decide the fol-
lowing three issues:
(1) Did the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians "constitute such a
tribe of Indians as is subject to the guardianship of Congress?
(2) Is the acceptance of a conveyance in trust of the lands of these
Indians and an allotment ... in severalty a proper exercise of such
power?
(3) Is such a trust an instrumentality of the federal government
which Congress may exempt from taxation by the state?" 261
The court answered all three issues in the affirmative. The court
held that the Eastern Band is subject to federal guardianship, 62 but it
also provided dictum that has been cited as recognizing a limitation on
the authority of Congress over the Cherokees and affirming the juris-
diction of the state over the Cherokees.2 63 Next, the court found that
the guardianship power had been properly exercised2z and further
held that the method used to exercise the power was a political decision
to be made by Congress and not the courts.265 When it reached the
question whether the county could impose a tax on the Indian land, the
court said:
It has long been settled that a state may not, without the consent of
the federal government, tax a means or instrumentality of the latter
employed for the execution of its powers .... And it should be
noted that what we have here is not ... a tax levied upon the prop-
erty of wards of the government, but an attempt to tax property
which has been deeded to the government itself to be used by it in
behalf of its wards in the exercise of a power given it by the Constitu-
tion. The power to tax is the power to destroy; and, if the tax here
can be sustained, this property held by the government for a constitu-
261. Id at 305.
262. id at 307.
263. The court noted:
It is clear, however, that not every act of Congress with relation to the band would come
within the power .... [Tihe members of the band, by separation from the original
tribe, have become subject to the laws of the state of North Carolina; and clearly no act
of Congress in their behalf would be valid which interfered with the exercise of the
police power of the state. In such a situation, a law to be sustained must have relation to
the purpose for which the federal government exercises guardianship and protection over
a people subject to the laws of one of the states; i.e., it must have a reasonable relation to
their economic welfare.
Id See In re McCoy, 233 F. Supp. 409, 413-14 (E.D.N.C. 1964); State v. McAlhaney, 220 N.C.
387, 389, 17 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1941); Sasser v. Beck, 40 N.C. App. 668, 671-72, 253 S.E.2d 577, 579,
cert. denied, 298 N.C. 300, 259 S.E.2d 915 (1979).
264. 53 F.2d at 307.
265. Id at 308.
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tional purpose can be destroyed in its hands.
2 66
The court further held that the method of creation of the Cherokee
Indian Reservation did not affect the result of the suit.267 Although
title to the land once was held by the state after the Treaty of New
Echota, the acquisition of the property by the federal government now
precluded state taxation.2 68 Finally, the court held that congressional
authorization and payment of taxes on this land from 1890 to 1924 was
"a mere matter of legislative policy which Congress had the right to
change at any time. 2 69
After Wright the Cherokees seemed secure on their land for the
first time in more than a century. But the attack upon their lands did
not stop. Throughout the 1930's the tribe was involved in litigation
that questioned the Indians' rights to portions of the reservation. 70
Only six years after Wright the Fourth Circuit decided another case
attacking the status of the land. In United States v. Colvard,27' a suit to
enjoin trespass against Indian land, the defendants had entered upon
Cherokee lands and had built a road from their sawmill to a public
highway. They then started a successful state cartway proceeding
against two individual Indians. 72 The court ruled that it had jurisdic-
tion to enjoin trespass and was not estopped from issuing its injunction
by the prior proceeding in the state court.2 73 The court pointed out that
a roadway across Indian lands could be obtained only by adhering to
federal procedures.2 74
266. Id at 308-09.
267. Id at 311.
268. Id
269. Id at 312. The court also held that the 1924 Act was not improper class legislation even
though the Indians were citizens of the United States and North Carolina. Id at 311-12. For
citizenship of Indians see 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1976); DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra
note 159, at 516-26.
270. During the 1930's the federal district court consistently ruled against the Cherokees in all
land suits and was consistently reversed by the Fourth Circuit. One case was apparently not
appealed, but the conclusions and rationale of the decision clearly were refuted by the Fourth
Circuit the following year. Compare United States v. Rose, 20 F. Supp. 350 (W.D.N.C. 1937) with
United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1938).
271. 89 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1937).
272. See id at 313.
273. Id at 313-15. The court found that the United States "was not made a party to the
proceedings in the state court, and consequently is not bpund by these proceedings had behind its
back." Id at 314.
274. Id at 314-15. For such procedures, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 311-328 (1976).
A criminal suit also grew out of the circumstances that led to the Co/yard action. In State v.
Adams, 213 N.C. 243, 195 S.E. 822 (1938), the farm agent of the Cherokee Indian Agency, a white
man, was convicted for destroying a cartway bridge and for hindering the construction of a
cartway. The court found jurisdiction and applied its criminal laws to offenses committed within
the Indian reservation. Id at 245-47, 195 S.E. at 823-24. The defendant argued that Cohard
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A year later, the Fourth Circuit decided another land case in
United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land."5  A local power company
claimed title to Cherokee lands under a separate chain of title and by
adverse possession. In finding that the United States, as trustees for the
Cherokees, held superior title to the land in question, the court said:
The determinative fact is that the federal government has assumed
towards ... [the Cherokees] the same sort of guardianship that it
exercises over other tribes of Indians, from which it results that their
property becomes an instrumentality of that government for the ac-
complishment of a proper governmental purpose and may not be
taken from them by contract, adverse possession, or otherwise, with-
out its consent.
.. . It is beyond the power of the state, either through statutes
of limitation or adverse possession, to affect the interest of the United
States; and the United States manifestly has an interest in preserving
the property of these wards of the government for their use and bene-fit.27 6
2. Civil Jurisdiction
During this period the courts were presented with a number of
jurisdictional questions. Blair v. McAlhane 27" involved the refusal of
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to renew the license of McAlhaney
to operate a store on the Cherokee Reservation. McAlhaney sued the
commissioner and the Superintendent of the Cherokee Agency in fed-
eral court to enjoin them from interfering with his business. The court
ruled that it was without jurisdiction to review the action of the Com-
missioner in granting or refusing this license, recognizing that this was
protected his actions against prosecution. The court rejected the defense because neither of the
parties in Adams were parties in Col'ard. Id at 246, 195 S.E. at 823. Therefore, the defense was
merely a collateral attack upon the state cartway proceeding. Id
Construction of highways across Cherokee lands has been challenged in more recent cases.
In Walkingstick v. Andrus, No. BC-79-205 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 1980), individual tribarmembers
sued the Secretary of the Interior and the North Carolina Department of Transportation seeking
to enjoin the construction of a highway across the Cherokee Indian Reservation because of alleged
violations of the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court dismissed the suit on the
merits, ruling that the actions and procedures followed by the federal and state defendants did not
violate the Act. The Fourth Circuit filed an unpublished per curiam affirmance, adopting the
memorandum of the district court. Walkingstick v. Andrus, No. 80-1191 (4th Cir., July 3, 1980).
In the most recent Cherokee ease, the Tribe sought injunctive relief against seventeen individ-
uals in order that a highway might be completed across the reservation. Eastern Band of Chero-
kee Indians v. Griffin, No. BC-80-204 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 1980). A federal court recently granted
the Tribe's motion for a permanent injunction.
275. 97 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1938).
276. Id at 422-23.
277. 123 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1941) (per curiam).
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a matter within the control and discretion of the federal goverment.
Haile v. Saunooke27 9 involved another jurisdictional dispute in
1957. Saunooke was a personal injury action in federal court against
individual Indians, the tribe itself, and the United States in its capacity
as trustee and guardian for the tribe. The court dismissed the suit
against the tribe, finding that "a tribe of Indians under the tutelage of
the United States is not subject to suit without the consent of Con-
gress. '280 The court rejected the argument that the 1889 incorporation
of the tribe made them subject to such suit.28 ' The court, however, did
allow the plaintiffs to proceed against the individual Indian defendants
and stated that they could recover from the United States if they could
show negligence or wrongful acts by an employee of the government
acting within the scope of his office.282
In 1978 the Fourth Circuit decided a jurisdictional dispute over
the Cherokee trout program. In Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v.
North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, 283 the tribe sought a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief prohibiting the state from
selling fishing licenses to non-Indians fishing on the Cherokee reserva-
tion. The district court found that the -federal government had pre-
empted the state's regulation of fishing on the reservation and ruled
that the state had no authority to levy and collect fishing license fees.2
84
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, observing that the state had no compel-
ling interest in the program and that requiring the purchase of state
fishing licenses would have an adverse economic effect upon the
tribe.285 The court applied the preemption doctrine and found that the
proposed state regulation and taxation would frustrate tribal self-gov-
ernment.286
278. d at 143. Two years later the Fourth Circuit decided another licensing case in United
States v. Parton, 132 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1943) (per curiam). In Parton the government sought to
enjoin an Indian businessman from operating on the reservation without a license. The court held
that although Indians were exempt from the penalties prescribed in the federal code, they still
were subject to the licensing requirements. Id at 887. The court also rejected the argument that
the Eastern Band was not an Indian tribe and that their land was not an Indian reservation. Id
279. 246 F.2d 293 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957).
280. Id at 297.
281. "[A]n act of a state legislature cannot be allowed to interfere with the guardianship over
these people which the United States has assumed, since Congress alone must determine the ex-
tent to which the immunities and protection afforded by the tribal status are to be withdrawn."
Id at 297-98.
282. Id at 298.
283. 588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978).
284. See id at 77.
285. Id at 79.
286. Id at 78.
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The following year the tribe filed a federal suit against the North
Carolina Department of Revenue and Swain County, North Carolina,
asserting that the state and county were without authority or jurisdic-
tion to impose income and personal property taxes on tribal members
living and working on the Cherokee Indian Reservation.287 The dis-
trict court held that the state had authority to levy and collect these
income and property taxes "on the basis of the unique history of the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians."2 ' The court ruled that because
Congress had not addressed specifically the issue of income or personal
property taxation of the Cherokees in the 1924 Cherokee Allotment
Act, there was no federal preemption of these forms of state taxation.289
The case is now on appeal to the Fourth Circuit.29 °
287. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, No. 78-30 (W.D.N.C., filed June 25, 1979).
288. Id slip. op. at 18.
289. Id slip. op. at 15.
290. As this Article went to print, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court,
ruling that "because the United States recognizes the Band as an Indian tribe and holds in trust
the Indian reservation on which its members live, the state must show express federal permission
to impose these taxes." Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, No. 79-1588, slip. op. at 4
(4th Cir.,fled Oct. 10, 1980). The court recounted an "abridged history" of the Eastern Band that
"demonstrates that the Act of 1924 significantly altered the relationship of the Band both to North
Carolina and to the United States." Id at 12. The court specifically rejected that state's argument
that it maintained authority over these Indians because of their state citizenship and the "unique
history" of the tribe. The court noted that "the dominion of North Carolina over the Eastern
Band, established by the 1835 Treaty of New Echota, is not immutable." Id at 17. The court
explained the result of its own previous Cherokee holdings was that
the members of the Eastern Band of Cherokees have a dual status. They are citizens of
North Carolina. Nevertheless, they are a federally recognized Indian tribe, and the land
on which they earn their livelihood is a federally recognized Indian reservation held in
trust for their benefit by the United States.
Id at 12-13. Thus, the court indicated that the Cherokees are entitled to the same legal status and
treatment as other Indian tribes and reservations recognized by the federal government. Princi-
ples of federal Indian law were applied to resolve this conflict, with the court relying on White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S. Ct. 2578 (1980), United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634
(1978), and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
In United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160 (4th Cir. 1974), another tax case came before the
Fourth Circuit. In Crilzer a Cherokee Indian was convicted of federal income tax evasion. The
defendant had been advised by Bureau of Indian Affairs officials that she was not taxable for
rental income from her possessory interest holdings on Indian land. Id at 1161. The appellate
court reversed her conviction, finding that the "defendant cannot be guilty of willfully evading
and defeating income taxes on income, the taxability of which is so uncertain that even co-ordi-
nate branches of the United States Government plausibly reach directly opposing conclusions."
Id at 1162. After reversal of her criminal conviction, Mrs. Critzer filed a civil suit in the Court of
Claims seeking a ruling that her income derived on the Cherokee Reservation was exempt from
federal income taxation. The trial division ruled in her favor, but the full panel reversed. Critzer
v. United States, 597 F.2d 708, (Ct. Cl.) cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 239 (1979). The court followed the
well-established rule that only income directly derived from a tribal member's portion of the tribal
land is exempt from federal taxation. Id at 711-12. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
Her income was found to be too remote to fall into the exemption. 597 F.2d at 713.
In State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Board of Comm'rs of Swain County, 262 N.C. 475, 137 S.E.2d
801 (1964), the court held that Swain County, North Carolina, was required to spend welfare
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In 1979 the North Carolina Court of Appeals also ruled on the
civil jurisdiction of the state courts over Cherokee Indians. In Sasser P.
Beck,2 91 the plaintiff sued an Indian motel operator for injuries sus-
tained by a youth in a swimming pool accident occurring on the reser-
vation. In a case of first impression, the court ruled that the North
Carolina courts have civil jurisdiction over such tort claims. 92 The
court concluded that
North Carolina has had civil jurisdiction over the Eastern Band of
Cherokee at least since the emigration west following the Treaty of
New Echota .... The fact that these Indians have since been recog-
nized as an Indian tribe and brought under federal supervision did
not remove the existing jurisdiction of the State of North Caro-
lina.29
3
In its most recent action, the Eastern Band of Cherokees, together
with the Ketooah Band of Cherokees in Oklahoma, filed suit in federal
court against the Tennessee Valley Authority, seeking an injunction to
prevent the flooding of the Little Tennessee River and the completion
of the Tellico Dam project. 294 The Tellico Dam project has been the
subject of numerous lawsuits,29 including two that resulted in injunc-
tions halting construction for some four years, the last being the much
publicized "Snail Darter" case.2 96 On September 25, 1979, President
Carter signed the Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act
of 1980,297 which provided that "notwithstanding the provisions of [the
Endangered Species Act] or any other law," the TVA would complete
the Tellico project.298 The Cherokee suit claimed that this provision in
the Act was unconstitutional because it would infringe upon the reli-
funds for the Cherokees. Id at 478, 137 S.E.2d at 803. The court ruled that because North Caro-
lina had adopted the provisions of the Federal Social Security Act, the right of the Cherokees to
enjoy the benefits could not be impaired even though the Cherokees resided on tax exempt lands,
Id at 477-78, 137 S.E.2d at 802-03. The court also summarily rejected the contention that the
Cherokees were not citizens and therefore not entitled to the benefits. Id at 477, 137 S.E.2d at
802-03.
291. 40 N.C. App. 668, 253 S.E.2d 577, ceri. denied, 298 N.C. 300, 259 S.E.2d 915 (1979).
292. Id at 674-75, 253 S.E.2d at 581.
293. Id at 673, 253 S.E.2d at 580.
294. Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), a 'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, - U.S. - (1980).
295. See, eg. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); United States ex re. TVA v. Two Tracts of
Land, 532 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund v.
TVA, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d
1164 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Three Tracts of Land, 415 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Tenn. 1976),
appeal docketed, No. 78-1098 (6th Cir.)
296. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
297. Pub. L. 96-69, 93 Stat. 479 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
298. Id tit. 4.
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gious exercise of traditional Cherokee Indians. The sites of a number
of former Cherokee villages, known as the "overhill" villages, are lo-
cated along the banks of the Little Tennessee River. The Cherokees
asserted that completion of the dam would deny them the right to make
pilgrimages to these sites sacred to their religion and would destroy the
fabric for their traditional religious beliefs.2 99 In 1978 Congress recog-
nized the constitutional protection due such religious beliefs when it
enacted the American Indian Religious Freedom Act.300
The District Court dismissed the suit, ruling that the Cherokees
had no "property interest" in the lands and that the First Amendment
was not a "license" to enter or use government property.30' On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the Cherokees had not alleged an
"infringement of a constitutionally cognizable First Amendment
right.' 30 2 The court ruled that the Cherokee affidavits demonstrated
only a "'personal preference'" in the use of the land, and that they did
not show that the land was central or indispensable to Cherokee reli-
gious observances. 0 3 In a dissent, Judge Merritt observed that "[i]n
view of the liberal rules of pleading and the protective attitude that
federal courts should follow in considering Indian claims, we should
reverse . . . in order to give the Cherokees an opportunity to offer
proof concerning the significance and centrality of their ancestral burial
grounds. ' 3°
3. Criminal Jurisdiction
During this period the courts decided a number of cases involving
significant questions of criminal jurisdiction. In State v. McAlhaney,3°5
a non-Indian defendant was convicted in the state court for assaulting
an Indian on the reservation. The defendant argued that the state court
was without jurisdiction on the reservation. The court held that the
federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal offenses
299. See 480 F. Supp. at 610; No. 79-1633, slip. op. at 2, 5-7 (6th Cir. April 15, 1980).
300. Pub. L. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. 11 1978)).
301. 480 F. Supp. at 612. The court also rejected a statutory claim based on the Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act because it found that the language "notwithstanding... any other law" in the
1980 Appropriation Act effectively exempted the Tellico project from the provisions of the first
act. See id at 411.
302. Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -(1980).
303. Id at 1164.
304. Id at 1165 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
305. 220 N.C. 387, 17 S.E.2d 352 (1941). See also States v. Adams, 213 N.C. 243, 195 S.E. 822
(1938).
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committed on the reservation.3" 6 "Criminal statutes relating to Indi-
ans," observed the court, "enacted by The Congress in furtherance of
the guardianship relation the Federal Government undertakes to main-
tain towards Indians, are not exclusive."3 7
In 1964 a federal court was presented with a question of the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the state courts over the Cherokees. In re McCoy3" 8
involved the conviction of a Cherokee in state court for felonious
breaking and entry. In a petition for habeas corpus to the federal dis-
trict court, the defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the state. Be-
cause the crime had been committed by an Indian on a reservation, he
argued that jurisdiction was exclusively with the federal courts.3 9 The
district court, however, held that the state had exercised criminal juris-
diction over the Cherokees since the Treaty of New Echota and that the
federal government had never exercised exclusive jurisdiction.3 10 The
court quoted from the Cherokee Trust Funds Case to the effect that
"they are citizens of that state, and bound by its laws." 31'
In United States v. Hornbuckle312 the Fourth Circuit heard its first
appeal questioning the jurisdiction of federal courts over crimes on the
Cherokee Resevation. An Indian convicted in federal court for assault
argued that the North Carolina state courts had exclusive jurisdiction.
In a per curiam decision, the court rejected this argument, observing:
"Contrary to [the defendant's] contention, the United States and North
Carolina exercise concurrent criminal jurisdiction over the reserva-
tion. ' 3 13
306. See id at 389, 17 S.E.2d at 354.
307. Id
308. 233 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
309. Id at 411.
310. Id at 412. The court noted that:
When sections 1151 and 1153 of Title 18 U.S.C.A. were enacted by Congress in 1948
they incorporated and codified the treaty of New Echota of 1835. The intention of the
legislators was not to circumvent or override the treaty, but to effectuate it and to regu-
late and control the prosecution of Indians in an area of ten major crimes where such
crimes were unaffected by treaties previously entered into by Congress. . . . Jurisdic-
tion of the two governments is concurrent; the state government derives it from the treaty
of New Echota, and the federal government derives it from its position as guardian and
protector of these native Americans.
Id at 414.
311. Id at 413 (quoting Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 117 U.S. 288, 311
(1886)).
312. 422 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). See also United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d
1250 (4th Cir. 1976) (federal jurisdiction applied to a second degree murder conviction of a Chero-
kee under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153 (1976)).
313. 422 F.2d at 391.
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4. Civil Rights Act
The 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act produced litigation that further
examined the legal status of the Cherokees. In Nettlie Crowe v. Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc.,314 a tribal member sued the tribe and
the United States under the Act, alleging due process and equal protec-
tion violations when the tribe assigned part of her lands to another tri-
bal member. The court found jurisdiction under the Act to hear the
suit.3 15 It then held that the tribe's assignment of land to another In-
dian, without a hearing or notice to the plaintiff, violated her right to
due process under the Act.316 The court went on to hold that the actual
assignment of the land was a decision to be made by the tribe and not
the court.31 In doing so, the Court discussed principles of Indian tribal
sovereignty and applied them to the North Carolina Cherokees:
What has been described as 'perhaps the most basic principle of all
Indian law' is that the powers vested in an Indian tribe are not pow-
ers granted by express Acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished ....
This doctrine of Indian sovereignty is relevant not only 'because
it provides a backdrop against which the [Indian Civil Rights Act]
must be read,' but also because it plays an integral role in the concept
of tribal property law....
. . . From this [description by the district court of the plaintiff's
property rights as vested] it would appear that the court was applying
Anglo-American principles of real property law, and in so doing
adopted an approach that was incompatible with the established
principle that lands belong to the Indian tribe as a community and
not to the members severally or as tenants in common .... Such a
controversy involving tribal land should not be resolved by the appli-
cation of technical rules of common law, but in the light of the tradi-
tions and customs of the Indian people.318
The jurisdictional ruling of Nettie Crowe survived for only four
314. 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974).
315. Id at 1234.
316. Id
317. Id at 1237.
318. Id at 1234-36. The tribe again was sued under the Civil Rights Act in Wachacha v.
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., No. 74-23, (W.D.N.C., filed Dec. 31, 1974). The plaintiff
tribal members alleged violations of due process and equal protection in a tribal election. The
court held that the representational scheme of the tribe for the Tribal Council violated the equal
protection provisions of the Act because it did not comply with the principles of Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), which were applicable to an Indian reservation. Wachacha v. Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians, Inc., No. 74-23, slip. op. at 14 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 31, 1974).
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years. In Berdina Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc.,319
the tribe again was sued under the Civil Rights Act for alleged viola-
tions in a tribal election. The district court dismissed the suit, finding
that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim.320 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit ruled that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear the
dispute.32 1 The court based its conclusion on the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 22 a 1978 case in which the
Court held that Indian tribes were protected by their sovereign immu-
nity against suits under the Indian Civil Rights Act.323 The Fourth Cir-
cuit found that the "clear and unequivocal holding" of Martinez
overruled the jurisdictional ruling in Nettie Crowe.324
C. The Result of Cherokee Legislation and Case Law
As a result of the legislation and case law dealing with the North
Carolina Cherokees a number of matters clearly are established with
respect to these Indians. It is now "well established that the Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians is an Indian Tribe within the meaning of the
Constitution and laws of the United States. 325 It is also clear that "the
federal government has assumed toward them the same sort of guardi-
anship that it exercises over other tribes of Indians. 3 26 The federal
government's long course of dealing with the tribe and its clear as-
sumption of trust responsibilities327 have established this "guard-
ianship" status.
These principles have been established despite the existence of the
Treaty of New Echota and the removal of the Cherokee Nation west of
319. 584 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
320. Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 334, 340 (W.D.N.C.
1977), rev'd, 584 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1978).
321. 584 F.2d at 45.
322. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
323. Id at 72.
324. 584 F.2d at 46.
The holding of Berdina Crowe was reaffirmed in Toineeta v. Andrus, No. BC-80-97
(W.D.N.C. August 13, 1980). In Toineefa, an individual tribal member sued the Secretary of the
Interior, other federal officials, and twenty-one tribal officers seeking a writ of mandamus and an
injunction, alleging she had been deprived of property without due process by the defendants.
The court dismissed her claim on the merits against the Indian defendants because the Indian
Civil Rights Act did not give federal jurisdiction over such intratribal disputes and because plain-
tiff did not state an enforceable civil rights claim under either 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985.
325. See, e.g., Haile v. Saunooke, 246 F.2d 293, 294 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893
(1957).
326. United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1938).
327. See Act of June 4, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-191, ch. 253, 43 Stat. 375.
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the Mississippi.32 The Treaty of New Echota, which divested the
Cherokees of all holdings in North Carolina,3 29 remains operative to-
day, but only to the extent that its terms are unmodified by later con-
gressional enactments. Historical and legal developments since 1835
have altered greatly the effects of this Treaty upon the Cherokees who
remained in North Carolina.
Congress has the power to unilaterally abrogate provisions of In-
dian treaties,330 as well as the power to change the terms or effects of
treaties.33' It also has the sole authority to recognize an Indian tribe
and extend federal guardianship.332 Once Congress determines the sta-
tus of an Indian group, that decision is binding on the courts. 333 Fur-
thermore, Indian reservations can be established in various ways. The
courts have recognized that full tribal and reservation status can be
acquired by treaty, statute, or executive order.334 Thus, it is not incon-
sistent for the Cherokees of North Carolina to have established full
legal status as an Indian tribe and as a reservation many years after the
Treaty of New Echota. This is exactly *hat happened.
The federal government, after taking "the same supervisory charge
of the North Carolina Cherokees as of other tribes of Indians 335 au-
thorized the tribe to sue to protect its land claims336 and appropriated
money to survey the land,337 to pay part of the costs of the suits, 338 to
328. See text accompanying notes 75-80 supra.
329. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
330. See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 671 (1912); Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 324
(1904) ("[T]he last in date must prevail"); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264,271 (1898); The Cherokee
Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870) ("A treaty may supercede a prior act of Congress, and
an act of Congress may supercede a prior treaty.")
331. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), in which the Supreme Court said:
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such
power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the
government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the inter-
est of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.
Id at 566.
332. See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1867), in which it was established
that such recognition is a political decision vested in Congress by the Constitution. Id at 419.
333. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913).
334. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-204 (1975); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v.
United States, 248 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1918); Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 403 (1896). Al-
though there is nothing magical about the term "reservation," federal acquisition of lands for
Indians can have the effect of preempting state authority over the affected Indians. See United
States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938).
335. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 259, § 3, 15 Stat. 228.
336. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 296, § 11, 16 Stat. 335.
337. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 455, 18 Stat. 204.
338. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 131, 18 Stat. 402.
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pay taxes on the land,339 and to clear title to the land.340 Congress then
directed these Indians to convey their land to the government in trust
with the intention of alloting it among the tribal members at a later
date.34 ' Congress, however, deferred this allotment of the Cherokee
land indefinitely,3 42 and in 1934 announced a national policy of defer-
ring allotments and extended indefinitely the trust period of Indian
trust lands.343 As a result of these congressional actions, the lands of
the North Carolina Cherokees are held in trust status and enjoy the
protection of the federal goverment to the same extent as other Indian
reservations. Any other conclusion ignores an entire body of federal
law.
VI. JURISDICTION
Principles of federal Indian law have not been applied consistently
by the North Carolina courts in asserting jurisdiction over the Cher-
okees. The opinions generally have found that the state has jurisdic-
tion over all persons within its borders.3 " One commentator, however,
has noted that these jurisdictional rulings are inconsistent with the gen-
eral trend in federal Indian law.345
The jurisdiction of a state generally is based on its sovereignty
over the land within its borders. In Indian affairs, however, the powers
of a state are limited by the supreme authority of the federal govern-
ment to regulate commerce with Indian tribes and to exercise its guard-
ianship responsibilities over its Indian wards.346 The constitutional
authority of the federal government to prescribe laws and to administer
justice on an Indian reservation is plenary.347 The task of the courts is
to determine how Congress actually exercised its constitutional powers.
When Indians are not involved in tribal relations, they are subject
339. Act of August 4, 1892, ch. 376, 27 Stat. 348.
340. Act of August 23, 1894, ch. 307, 28 Stat. 424.
341. Act of June 4, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-191, ch. 253, 43 Stat. 375.
342. Act of March 4, 1931, Pub. L. No. 71-841, ch. 494, 46 Stat. 1518.
343. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 463
(1976)).
344. See, e.g., State v. McAlhaney, 220 N.C. 387, 389, 17 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1941).
345. "The only clear exception to the pattern of affording either exclusive state or federal
jurisdiction over Indian lands is the situation with respect to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Reser-
vation in North Carolina, where federal and state judicial decisions have clearly indicated that the
jurisdiction is concurrent." Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands- A Journey through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Aruz. L, REv. 503, 570-71 (1976).
346. See generallyF. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 116-17 (1958).
347. See, e.g. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80, 383-85 (1886).
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to the police power of the state to the same extent as non-Indians. 348 A
state also has jursidiction over the conduct of an Indian while he is off
the reservation349 and has jurisdiction over some, but not all, acts of
non-Indians while they are on the reservation.350 In 1953 Congress
gave its consent for all states to assume limited criminal and civil juris-
diction over Indians and Indian reservations through Public Law
280.31 1 The Act, however, did not grant jurisdiction to North Carolina,
and the state has not brought itself under its provisions. 2 Prior to
Public Law 280, some states had exercised limited civil and criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian country.353 Congress also
had granted some states jurisdiction over specific Indian tribes and res-
ervations.354 Recent court decisions indicate that exercises of state ju-
risdiction, not in strict accordance with Public Law 280 or other
jurisdictional enactments, are subject to close scrutiny and are not eas-
ily upheld.355
Given the plenary authority of Congress over Indian affairs, North
Carolina would not appear to have more authority over the Indians
within its boundaries than those states granted powers under Public
Law 280 or other jurisdictional enactments. Because Congress has
been silent on the question of state jurisdiction over the Cherokee Res-
ervation since its establishment under the 1924 Act,356 this tribe would
appear to possess the same immunities from state regulation as pos-
sessed by tribes in states not granted jurisdiction by Congress.
The acknowledged authority on Indian Law was Felix S. Cohen,
former assistant Solicitor for the Department of the Interior and author
of the first comprehensive treatise on Indian law.357 While serving as
348. See, e.g., Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146 (1906); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
403-04 (1857).
349. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
350. See, e.g., New York v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240
(1896); Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621
(1881).
351. See text accompanying notes 237-49 supra.
352. Id
353. For criminal jurisdiction over offenses by non-Indians against non-Indians see Draper v.
United States, 164 US. 240 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). For taxation
of personal property of non-Indians see Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
354. See authorities cited in note 240 supra.
355. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164 (1973); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per curiam); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
356. Act of June 4, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-191, ch. 253, 43 Stat. 376.
357. Felix S. Cohen (1907-1953) was the author of HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
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Acting Solicitor, Cohen rendered his legal opinion on the status of the
North Carolina Cherokees to the then Attorney General of North Car-
olina:
It is true that during a certain period in their history, namely,
between the treaty of New Echota in 1835 ... and the act of July 27,
1868. . ., the Indians who now constitute the Eastern Band of Cher-
okees of North Carolina occupied an exceptional position in that
they had left their regular tribal organization and became subject to
the laws of the State of North Carolina and had lost all title to the
lands which they continued to occupy. But by the act of July 27,
1868, however, Congress regularized their position and instructed the
Secretary of the Interior to "cause the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs to take the same supervisory charge of the Eastern or North
Carolina Cherokees as of other tribes of Indians." From that time on
the Indians were again treated as wards of the Federal Government
receiving all the benefits and supervision generally accorded to other
Indians in the United States. It is true that thereafter, in 1889, the
Indians obtained a corporate charter from the North Carolina Legis-
lature. . . which regulated their tribal functions. The United States,
however, did not cease during this entire period to execise its guardi-
anship over these Indians.
The act of June 4, 1924. . . authorized the tribe to convey all its
land which it had obtained since the treaty of New Echota to the
United States. These lands were then declared tax free. This provi-
sion of the act of 1924 was upheld by the ruling in United States v.
Wright. . . . When the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934
. . . passed it was held to extend to the Cherokees who thereupon
voted in favor of the act.
This brief history would seem to show that since the act of 1868,
and certainly since the act of 1924, the Cherokees have in every re-
spect been treated by the Federal Government as any other tribe of
Indians and have enjoyed the same benefits and protection as Fed-
eral wards.358
The North Carolina Attorney General, however, never has accepted
this reasoning35 9 and, since the Cohen analysis was published only re-
cently, it probably never has been argued to the North Carolina courts.
supra note 346, published by the Department of Interior in 1942 and recently republished by the
University of New Mexico Press. Cohen's work was revised, with a new edition published as
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW by the Department of Interior in 1958. This revision has been criticized
and presently a new revision is being prepared for publication.
358. Letter from Felix S. Cohen, Acting Solicitor, Department of Interior, to Harry McMul-
lan, Attorney General of North Carolina (August 25, 1942), repnuedinDEPARTMENT OF INTE-
RIOR, 2 OPINIONS OF SOLICITOR OF DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS
1163 (1979).
359. See generally Brief for Attorney General, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch,
No. 78-30 (W.D.N.C., June 25, 1979); Letter from Malcolm B. Seawell, North Carolina Attorney
General, to James S. Currie, North Carolina Commissioner of Revenue (June 2, 1958).
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Indeed, the North Carolina case law dealing with jurisdiction of
the state courts over the Cherokees is not large. The case law dealing
with civil jurisdiction is very limited. The earliest case360 was not a
general consideration of the broad jurisdictional powers of the state
courts over individual Cherokees because of its narrow factual circum-
stances. Civil jurisdiction of the courts again was questioned in a 1966
case;36' the court, however, ruled on other grounds and avoided the
jurisdictional question. 62 Sasser v. Beck,363 recognizing the state's civil
jurisdiction over the Cherokees, was the first attempt of a North Caro-
lina court to come to grips with this issue. Unfortunately, the Court of
Appeals relied almost exclusively on prior North Carolina decisions,
some of which were criminal jurisdiction cases, and revealed a lack of
comprehension of general principles of federal Indian law.
The earliest North Carolina cases dealing with criminal jurisdic-
tion over Cherokees and their lands are now of little significance. Un-
fortunately, the North Carolina courts continually cite them with
unquestioning approval. State v. Ta-cha-na-tah,31 which extended the
state's criminal jurisdiction to the Cherokees, was decided in 1870
before the Cherokee lands were consolidated, before the land was con-
veyed in trust to the United States, and before the enactment of the
Major Crimes Act.3 65 In light of the state of the law as it related to
Indians in 1870, Ta-cha-na-tah was perhaps correct when it was ren-
dered. Because of the legal developments since that time, however, it
offers no significant guidance to the present state of the law.
State v. Wo/f,366 which upheld the conviction of a Cherokee for
violating a state compulsory school attendance law by not sending his
child to the Indian school, is a questionable decision, as was recognized
at the time by the strong dissent. Wolf simply was decided incorrectly.
This is made evident when it is noted that in 1892 Congress authorized
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to enforce attendance of Indian
children at Indian schools. 367 There was no mention of this Act in the
360. Rollins v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 87 N.C. 229 (1882). See text accompanying
notes 199-201 supra.
361. Young v. Sweet, 266 N.C. 623, 146 S.E.2d 669 (1966).
362. I d at 625, 146 S.E.2d at 671.
363. 40 N.C. App. 668, 253 S.E.2d 577, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 300, 259 S.E.2d 915 (1979). See
text accompanying notes 291-93 supra.
364. 64 N.C. 614 (1870).
365. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). See text accompanying note 167 supra.
366. 145 N.C. 440, 59 S.E. 40 (1907). See note 180 supra.
367. See Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 164, § 1, 27 Stat. 120, 143 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 282
(1976)). The Secretary of Interior is authorized to regulate enrollment and regular attendance of
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Wof opinion. Under present federal Indian law principles, such fed-
eral legislation would oust the state of any subject matter jurisdic-
tion.368
State v. Adams369 was decided correctly but perhaps for the wrong
reasons. In Adams the defendant, a non-Indian, was charged with de-
stroying property of another non-Indian on Cherokee lands. These
facts clearly bring Adams within the McBratney-Draper rule estab-
lished by the Supreme Court.370 Under this rule states are vested with
exclusive authority over offenses committed by non-Indians against
non-Indians in Indian country, unless Congress specifically has pro-
vided for exclusive federal jurisdiction.37' Although the North Caro-
lina court cited McBratney, the opinion rested on "a prima facie
presumption of rightful jurisdiction, '372 and there was no discussion of
the distinction made between Indians and non-Indians by the court.
In State v. McAlhaney3 73 the court reached a conclusion that con-
tributed significantly to the confusion in subsequent Cherokee jurisdic-
tion cases. The court ruled: "Criminal statutes relating to Indians,
enacted by The Congress in furtherance of the guardianship relation
the Federal Government undertakes to maintain towards Indians, are
not exclusive. ' 374  The Mcllhaney rationale was adopted in In re
McCojy75 when the federal district court observed that the federal gov-
ernment "has exercised concurrent jurisdiction in this area, but never
has it exercised exclusive jurisdiction. 3 76 This was the first time the
term "concurrent" was applied to this question, and the appearance of
this word added further confusion to an already clouded area of law.
Indian children in government or public schools. 25 U.S.C. § 282 (1976). Present day enforce-
ment of school attendance by Indian children is governed by id § 231 (1976), which authorizes the
Secretary of Interior to permit state agents to enter Indian lands to enforce state compulsory
school attendance laws, but only if the Indian tribe "has adopted a resolution consenting to such
application." Id For non-Cherokee cases construing § 231, see In re Colwash, 57 Wash. 2d 196,
356 P.2d 994 (1960) (en banc); State v. Superior Court, 57 Wash. 2d 181, 356 P.2d 985 (1960) (en
banc).
368. See authority cited in note 420 infra. See also note 180 supra.
369. 213 N.C. 243, 195 S.E. 822 (1938).
370. See New York v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240
(1896); Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621
(1885).
371. Authorities cited note 370 supra.
372. 213 N.C. at 245, 195 S.E. at 823. This legal presumption is no longer the law in North
Carolina after State v. Batdorf, 293 N.C. 486, 494, 238 S.E.2d 497, 502-03 (1977) (state has burden
to show beyond a reasonable doubt that N.C. has jurisdiction).
373. 220 N.C. 387, 17 S.E.2d 352 (1941).
374. Id at 389, 17 S.E.2d at 354.
375. 233 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.C. 1964). See text accompanying notes 308-11 supra.
376. 233 F. Supp. at 412.
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When the question of criminal jurisdiction finally reached the Fourth
Circuit, the matter was still not clarified. In United States v. Horn-
buckle377 the court repeated the simplistic conclusion of McCoy and
observed that "the United States and North Carolina exercise concur-
rent criminal jurisdiction over the reservation." '378
The rationale for this line of cases clearly was rebutted by the
Supreme Court in 1978 when it specifically held in United States v.
John379 that certain federal criminal jurisdiction statutes were exclu-
sive.380 In John a Choctaw Indian was convicted in federal court of a
lesser offense to a charge of assault with intent to kill. The questions
before the Supreme Court were (1) whether the Choctaw Indian Reser-
vation was "Indian country" and therefore covered by the federal crim-
inal statutes applicable to Indians, and (2) "whether these federal
criminal statutes operate[d] to preclude the exercise of state criminal
jurisdiction over the offenses."' 38 ' After determining that the Choctaw
Reservation, which, like the North Carolina Cherokee Reservation,
was created for a remnant band following the removal of most of the
Choctaw Nation to Oklahoma in the 1830's, was "Indian country, 382
the Court then found that legislative history and prior Supreme Court
decisions supported the conclusion that the federal criminal statutes
were "pre-emptive of state jurisdiction." 383
The Supreme Court of Maine recently reached this same conclu-
sion under factual circumstances even more favorable to the state's in-
terest than those involving the North Carolina Cherokees. The
question before the court in State v. Dana384 concerned the application
of the term "Indian country," which is used in federal criminal statutes,
to Passamaquoddy Indians, whose status as "bona fide Indians" is not
established as clearly as that of the Cherokees. 8 5 The Maine court rec-
377. 422 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). See text accompanying notes 312-13 supra.
378. 422 F.2d at 391. See, however, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, No. 79-1588
(4th Cir. Oct. 10, 1980), in which the court stated that North Carolina "acknowledges that John
casts doubt on the viability of [Hornbuckle]." Id at 16 n.34.
379. 437 U.S. 634 (1978). For other cases holding that federal statutes give exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts see Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351
(1962); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 & n.5 (1959); Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
380. 437 U.S. at 651. The statutory provisions were 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976) (Major Crimes
Act; see text accompanying notes 165-69 supra) and 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976) (statutory definition
of "Indian country").
381. 437 U.S. at 635.
382. Id at 648-50.
383. Id at 651 & n.22.
384. 404 A.2d 551 (Me. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1064 (1980).
385. Id at 552-53.
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ognized that when the statutory definition of "Indian country" was en-
acted in 1948, Congress was involved in !"virtually a new undertaking"
in which it sought to "'consolidate. . . numerous conflicting and in-
consistent provisions of law into a concise statement of the applicable
law. ' 3 6 The court found that Congress sought to apply to all "depen-
dent Indian communities" a uniform "protection that certain enumer-
ated crimes committed within any such Indian community would be
controlled by federal, instead of state, jurisdiction. 38 7
After the John decision, North Carolina officials conceded that the
state courts are without criminal jurisdiction for acts included in the
Major Crimes Act.388 State and federal law enforcement officials inter-
preted the decision differently, and local state officials soon withdrew
most law enforcement services from the reservation. 9 Constrained to
fill this sudden void, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, with the approval of
the Cherokee Tribal Council, authorized the establishment of a Court
of Indian Offenses. 39 ° The court system is designed "to provide an ade-
quate machinery for law enforcement" on the Cherokee Reserva-
tion.391 Once this court is operational, many of the previous criminal
jurisdiction conflicts will be resolved. For offenses committed on the
Reservation, the federal courts will continue to try Indian and non-
Indian felons, the Indian Court will try the lesser offenses commited by
Indians, and the state courts will try non-Indians for lesser offenses.
Tribal officials have begun studies that may result in the eventual re-
placement of the Court of Indian Offenses with a purely Tribal
Court. 9 Tribal officials hope that their local court system eventually
will become the primary forum for both criminal and civil disputes that
arise on the reservation which involve Indians.393
Thus, it seems clear that the conclusion of the North Carolina
Supreme Court in McAlhaney has been invalidated completely. Even
386. Id at 535.
387. Id at 557.
388. Letter from Rufus L. Edmisten, North Carolina Attorney General, to Harold M. Ed-
wards, U.S. Attorney, W.D.N.C., (Aug. 8, 1978).
389. The North Carolina Attorney General recognized that the resulting lack of state jurisdic-
tion after John would necessitate a reduction in the authority of the Cherokee Police Department.
See id at 7.
390. See 44 Fed. Reg. 24,305 (1979) (to be codified in 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(a)).
391. Id at 24,305-06.
392. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976); 25 C.F.R. § 11.2 (1979).
393. One of the judicial problems that will have to be dealt with immediately is the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to 1963 (Supp. I 1978), in which Congress specifically
referred matters of placement of Indian children in custody cases to Indian tribes and their local
courts for determination. Id § 1911.
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though the North Carolina Attorney General has conceded jurisdiction
for felonies on the reservation,394 the courts have not yet tempered the
erroneous language and rationale of McAlhaney, McCoy, and Horn-
buckle.
Moreover, the application of this erroneous rationale and pre-
sumption in the area of jurisdiction, together with the imprecise use of
the term "concurrent," has contributed not only to confusion in the
courts but also to confusion in law enforcement agencies in western
North Carolina. 95 For several decades, federal and state officials
shared enforcement of criminal laws on the Cherokee Reservation.
Whether an individual was tried in federal or state court often de-
pended primarily on which officer was first on the scene to make an
arrest. The term "concurrent" was, quite naturally, interpreted on the
local level to mean that federal and state governments and courts had
equal powers and responsibilities over the Indians on the reservation.
There is a sense, of course, in which "concurrent" is correct when
applied to federal and state jurisdiction over an Indian reservation.
For example, it is well established that states have both criminal and
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country in matters not af-
fecting Indians, their property, or their tribal self-government.396 In
that context, the term "concurrent" refers not to simultaneous jurisdic-
tion over the same events and persons, but rather to simultaneous juris-
diction over the same territory with different persons and different
subject matters. Unfortunately, this distinction has not been made in
the Cherokee cases.
Another aspect of the Cherokee cases that continues to contribute
to confusion and erroneous results is the failure to the courts to apply
the federal preemption doctrine in a civil context. Preemption is a con-
stitutional doctrine that permits the federal government to oust some or
all state authority over specific subject matter areas.3 97 It is based on
the exercise of constitutional authority-usually the Commerce Clause,
coupled with the Supremacy Clause39 8-and is applied to resolve con-
flicts in Indian country. If preemption is found, state authority is ex-
394. Letter, supra note 388.
395. See text accompanying notes 277-293 supra.
396. See text accompanying notes 350-54 supra.
397. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376-77 n.2 (1976); Warren Trading Post
Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690-91 (1965).
398. See generally Note, The Pre-emption Doctrine: Shiing Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975); Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground- a New
Cannon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
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cluded in favor of federal or tribal authority.3 99 While this doctrine has
been approved by the Fourth Circuit in a civil setting,4° the North
Carolina courts still have not recognized its proper application to the
Cherokees,40  and a United States District Court recently misinter-
preted the doctrine.40 z
In Sasser v. Beck,4"3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals justified
its finding of state civil jurisdiction on prior Cherokee cases and distin-
guished all non-Cherokee case law and legislation. Unfortunately, the
court justified its holding with incorrect factual assumptions. 4 It dis-
missed federal preemption with the unsupported conclusion that "[t]he
fact that these Indians have since been recognized as an Indian tribe
and brought under federal supervision did not remove the existing ju-
risdiction of the State of North Carolina. ' 4 °5
The federal district court in Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v.
Lynch406 followed this same rationale, finding the Cherokees subject to
state taxation because the 1924 Cherokee Allotment Act did not specify
exemption from income or personal property taxes and because the
"unique history" of the Cherokees gave North Carolina authority over
these Indians.407 Once again, the court ignored non-Cherokee federal
399. See generally authorities cited in note 420 infra.
400. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n,
588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 283 & 284 supra.
401. See Sasser v. Beck, 40 N.C. App. 668, 253 S.E.2d 577, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 300, 259
S.E.2d 915 (1979).
402. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, No. 78-30 (W.D.N.C., filed June 21
1979). See text accompanying notes 287-89 supra.
403. 40 N.C. App. 668, 253 S.E.2d 577, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 300, 259 S.E.2d 915 (1979).
404. The court cited Haile v. Saunooke, see text accompanying notes 279-82 supra, as support-
ing jurisdiction in the state courts, stating that the federal court "allowed the suit against the
individual Indian defendants." 40 N.C. App. at 672, 253 S.E.2d at 580. The federal court in
Saunooke, however, had subject matter jurisdiction in that suit because the "transaction" took
place in "Indian country" and by virtue of diversity of citizenship. Under such facts, jurisdiction
in the federal forum does not afortiori establish jurisdiction in a state forum. The court also
misinterpreted the effect of Public Law 280 and language in Public Law 280 and the 1968 Indian
Civil Rights Act giving "to any State not having jurisdiction" the power to assume civil jurisdic-
tion. The court found that North Carolina had jurisdiction before the enactment of Public Law
280, which granted civil jurisdiction to five states. 40 N.C. App. at 672-73, 253 S.E.2d at 580. The
court rejected the idea that "any state not having jurisdiiion" should be interpreted as "any state
not having jurisdiction by virtue of. . . earlier stalute.r," Id at 673, 253 S.E.2d at 580, and
concluded that "such an interpretation would be nonsensical if applied to Sec. 7 of Public Law
280, since it was the first statute enacted on the subject." Id at 673, 253 S.E,2d at 580. This was
clearly an incorrect conclusion. Congress had previously, on a number of occasions, enacted stat-
utes "on the subject." See statutes cited in note 240 supra.
405. 40 N.C. App. at 673, 253 S.E.2d at 580.
406. No. 78-30 (W.D.N.C. June 25, 1979). See text accompanying notes 287-89 supra.
407. Id, slip op. at 15, 18.
CHEROKEE HISTORICAL ANAL YSIS
Indian cases408 and even reversed the presumptions established by the
Supreme Court for Indian preemption cases.
40 9
That the North Carolina state courts have never applied this doc-
trine is evident from the continued reliance on dictum from United
States v. Wright t.4 1  The Wright court stated:
[W]e think there can be no doubt that Congress has the power to
legislate for the protection of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
and for the regulation of the affairs of the band. It is clear, however,
that not every act of Congress with relation to the band would come
within the power .... Itihe members of the band, by separation
from the original tribe, have become subject to the laws of the state
of North Carolina; and clearly no act of Congress in their behalf
would be valid which interfered with the exercise of the police power
of the state. In such a situation, a law to be sustained must have
relation to the purpose for which the federal government exercises
guardianship and protection over a people subject to the laws of one
of the states, i.e., it must have reasonable relation to their economic
welfare.4 1
This language perhaps was supportable in 1931, considering the state of
the law at that time, but it is clearly incorrect today. In 1931 there was
some uncertainty, both as a matter of constitutional and statutory law,
regarding federal authority to preempt state jurisdiction over Indian
reservations. As a matter of constitutional law, the Supreme Court was
still following its "dual sovereignty" approach under the Commerce
Clause.412 But that approach was rejected completely by the Supreme
Court in the 1930's.41 3 Furthermore, principles of federal preemption
in Indian affairs were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1938. In United
408. The court dismissed John as having "no bearing" because it was a criminal case. Id, slip
op. at 1I. The court, however, subsequently cited McAlhaney and Wolf as establishing jurisdic-
tion over the Cherokees. Id, slip op. at 17-18.
409. The test established by the Supreme Court for federal preemption in Indian cases in-
cludes a strong presumption against state taxation and requires the state to show affirmative ap-
proval from Congress to tax reservation Indians. See generally Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S.
373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). The district court reversed
this presumption. It assumed that the state tax was valid and insisted that the Indians show that
Congress had specifically exempted them from the particular form of tax under question. See
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, No. 78-30, slip op. at 9-18 (W.D.N.C. June 25, 1979).
As this Article went to print, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and applied the
same presumption established by the Supreme Court in other Indian cases. See note 290 supra.
410. 53 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 539 (1932). See notes 260-69 and
accompanying text supra.
411. Id at 307.
412. See Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L.
REv. 645, 883 (1946).
413. See, eg., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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States v. McGowan414 the Ninth Circuit held that land purchased in
trust by the United States for Indians in Nevada was not "Indian coun-
try" and therefore was not subject to a federal criminal statute in ques-
tion.415 In upholding the state's jurisdiction, the court used language
similar to that used in Wright.416 The Supreme Court, however, unani-
mously reversed 417 and upheld federal authority over the land because
it was indeed "Indian country. ' '418 In the course of its opinion, the
Court said that "[e]nactments of the Federal Government passed to
protect and guard its Indian wards ... affect the operation ... of such
state laws as conflict with the federal enactments.
41 9
The restrictive language in Wright simply does not harmonize
with the language, rationale, or results of the Indian preemption cases
decided by the Supreme Court during the past twenty years.4 20 In these
cases the Court has found preemption arising from federal action of a
414. 89 F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
415. Id at 202.
416. Id
417. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
418. Id at 539. The standards used by the Supreme Court were codified by Congress when it
enacted the present statutory definition of "Indian country." See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (1966) (Re-
viser's Note).
419. 302 U.S. at 539. For other cases sustaining federal power over Indian reservations estab-
lished in a state after statehood, see Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 200-05 (1975); Arizona
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). See also Board ofCounty Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705,
715-19 (1943).
420. The recent Indian pre-emption cases decided by the Supreme Court are: United States v.
John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978), Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per
curiam); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Organized Vil-
lage of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
In a recent opinion from the Department of the Interior, the acting Associate Solicitor "con-
clude[d] that North Carolina state courts lack jurisdiction to order the execution of a judgment
against a tribal member on the Cherokee Indian Reservation." Memorandum from Hans Walker,
Jr., Acting Associate Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs, to the Agency Special Officer, Cherokee
Agency, 1, (May 5, 1980). Relying on the Supreme Court's Indian preemption cases, the opinion
found that
under general principles of Indian law, therefore, the state is precluded from asserting
jurisdiction over Indian property on the reservation both because the state has not fol-
lowed the procedures set out in 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 to obtain jurisdiction and be-
cause the exercise of such jurisdiction would infringe on the authority of [the] Eastern
Band of Cherokees and the Cherokee Court of Indian Offenses.
Id at 3. The opinion recognized that many state and lower federal courts (MM41haney, Horn-
buckle, McCoy) had relied on the Wright dictum to rule "that the general principles of Indian
jurisdiction have been modified with respect to the Eastern Band of Cherokees because of the
special history of that group." Id at 4. The opinion, however, found that John rejected this. Id
"[It is now clear that the decisions of state and lower federal courts holding that North Carolina
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general nature, such as setting aside land for an Indian tribe. The
power of the state then is analyzed by the Court against a "backdrop"
of the tribe's inherent governmental sovereignty. Since Williams v.
Lee42 was decided in 1959, the Supreme Court has approved state ju-
risdiction within an Indian reservation only once. In Moe v. Confeder-
ated Salsh & Kootena Tribes of the Flathead Reservation4 22 the Court
prohibited any state taxation of the Indians, but upheld a state law re-
quiring an Indian merchant to collect state taxes from non-Indian cus-
tomers when the tribe itself did not tax the sales transaction.423
It is apparent that the North Carolina courts are unduly impressed
with the State's actual "assumption" of jurisdiction over the Cherokee
Reservation. But the acquiescence by Indians or the federal govern-
ment in past actions of the state does not in itself authorize state juris-
diction.424 It is not unusual for state governmental and administrative
officials to trespass on tribal affairs. These trespasses, however, have
not impaired the vested rights of Indian tribes.425 "Power and author-
ity rightfully conferred do not necessarily cease to exist in consequence
of long [nonuse]. 426
The North Carolina courts have failed to heed a necessary caveat
in reading and interpreting Indian cases and statutes. The proper con-
struction of such matters was pointed out in a leading treatise in the
field:
has more jurisdiction over the [Cherokee Reservation] than states usually have over Indian reser-
vations are no longer good law. Id at 6 (emphasis added).
The opinion, furthermore, rejected the ruling of the federal district court in Lynch. Lynch
upheld state taxation of Cherokee personal property because of a lack of" 'any showing that state
and local taxation interferes with reservation self-government or impairs any right granted or
reserved by federal law." Id at 7 (quoting Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, No. 78-
30, slip op. at 12 (W.D.N.C. June 25, 1979)). The opinion noted that since Lynch "the federal
government ha[d] established the Cherokee Court of Indian Offenses in order to advance tribal
self-government," and concluded that
[sltate assertion of jurisdiction to seize Indian property on the reservation without in-
volvement of the Cherokee Court of Indian Offenses would both interfere with the right
of that court to regulate such activity and with the right of the Band to decide for itself
how judgments should be enforced.
Id
421. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
422. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
423. Id at 481-83.
424. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300, 312 (4th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S.
539 (1932) (acquiesence of federal government in payment of taxes on Cherokee lands prior to
1925 did not estop the government from exempting the land from state taxation).
425. Incursions by state governments into tribal affairs are set aside when challenged in the
courts. See cases cited in note 420 sufpra.
426. United States v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 697 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In referring to any court decision or law, careful consideration
must be given to its date, because its importance may lie solely in the
historical situation to which it applied. While some decisions of the
courts may be explained on the basis of express constitutional pow-
ers, the language in other cases indicates that decisions were influ-
enced by a consideration of the peculiar relationship between
Indians and the Federal Government at a particular period in our
history.42 7
The North Carolina courts have failed to consider the effect of subse-
quent legislation on such legal milestones as the Treaty of New Echota
and the dictum in the Cherokee Trust Funds Case and United States v.
Wright. Consideration of general Indian legislation, such as the Indian
Reorganization Act and Public Law 280, has been limited in scope.
The courts have accepted their prior decisions as settling the jurisdic-
tion issue for all time without viewing them in an historical context or
considering that the application of prior decisions may have been mod-
ified by other non-Cherokee federal Indian legislation or case law. In
short, the North Carolina courts have not realized that federal Indian
law applies to the North Carolina Cherokees.
In spite of the seriousness of these errors, it is easy to see how the
courts have reached their present posture. Until the tribe retained an
attorney in 1957,428 the Cherokees were virtually without legal repre-
sentation. Their sole representation was provided by the federal gov-
ernment and consisted primarily of defending the tribe against assaults
on their land base. Not surprisingly, the courts have consistently pro-
tected the status of the Cherokee lands, but in cases involving individu-
als, the courts have disregarded their tribal status. Furthermore,
because of the geographical isolation of the Cherokees, cases have not
been appealed routinely until recently, and because only one federally
recognized Indian tribe remains within the state, no expertise has de-
veloped within the state bar or judiciary.4 29 The courts never have un-
427. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 159, at 23.
428. The Honorable Frank M. Parker was the first attorney hired by the Tribe on a continuing
basis. Judge Parker served as Tribal Attorney until his appointment to the North Carolina Court
of Appeals on January 23, 1968.
429. To indicate the lack of expertise in or recognition of the application of federal Indian law
to the North Carolina Cherokees, as of December, 1979, the North Carolina Supreme Court Li-
brary did not contain a copy of either of the standard treatises on Indian law--Cohen's HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942) or the later revision by the Department of the Interior,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958). The North Carolina treatises are generally deficient in this area.
For example, STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX (1977), contains only a two-page discussion on
the topic "Indians" and cites only three cases. Nothing in STRONG'S INDEX would indicate the
existence of a substantial body of case and statutory law.
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derstood that individual Cherokees, as well as their lands, are
controlled by a separate set of legal principles.
It is beyond question that federal supremacy has emerged as the
controlling principle in federal Indian jurisdiction cases. But oft-re-
peated, traditional convictions are perhaps the most difficult to dis-
place. So it is with the North Carolina courts' continued assertion of
"unique powers" over the Cherokees. States have obtained jurisdiction
over, or responsibility for, Indians within their borders in one of the
following ways: (1) Indians have migrated off their reservations seek-
ing employment and have settled in the communities, subjecting them-
selves to state laws;430 (2) the federal government has by statute
transferred certain functions to the states pertaining to Indians still liv-
ing on reservations;431 or (3) the federal government has terminated its
special responsibility for an individual Indian tribe.432 Because of the
"unique relationship" between the federal government and the Indian
tribes, states must obtain jurisdiction over Indians in one of these three
ways.
In North Carolina, once the federal government "recognized" the
Cherokees who remained after the Treaty of New Echota, it assumed
political and economic responsibility for them, provided for their wel-
fare, and accepted title to their lands in trust. No room was left for
authority by the state except as specifically delegated by the federal
government. Since the establishment of the trust status of the Cherokee
lands in 1924, the federal government has not transferred control over
the Cherokees to North Carolina, and the Cherokee tribal status has
not been terminated. Therefore, North Carolina is without judicial ju-
risdiction over the people, lands, and affairs of the Cherokee Indian
Reservation. The federal government has preempted supervisory du-
ties and jurisdiction over the Cherokee Indians.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Barbara Tuchman has pointed out, in matters of historical in-
vestigation, contradictions are "not merely a matter of conflicting evi-
dence," but a "part of life."433 One should "expect contradictions, not
uniformity. '43 4 This is certainly true in an historical review of the
430. See, eg., Nagle v. United States, 191 F. 141 (9th Cir. 1911).
431. See text accompanying notes 237-40 supra.
432. See statutes cited in note 235 supra.
433. B. TucrmtAN, A DISTANT MMROR xvii (1978).
434. Id
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North Carolina Cherokee Indians. If we are to examine the Cherokees
for the purpose of determining their present legal status, we should ex-
pect cross-currents and apparently conflicting developments over the
past 150 years. The interests of the state and federal governments, and
of the Cherokees themselves, have been in competition and conflict
may times during the past two centuries. This Article has attempted to
view these developments with some sense of historical and legal per-
spective and to resolve some of these conflicts by viewing the Cherokee
cases against the larger backdrop of federal Indian law, in order to de-
termine what law seems most pertinent to these Indians today.
The interpretations of the North Carolina courts reveal a continu-
ing paternalistic view of the Cherokees and a stubborn refusal to sur-
render the antifederalist attitude in the area of Indian affairs. In even
the most recent cases435 the North Carolina courts continue to decline
to follow decisions of other courts dealing with Indian tribes. In North
Carolina, law continues to be made by dictum. None of the early cases
are questioned, analyzed, or viewed with an historical perspective.
The Cherokee cases seem to indicate that North Carolina has ju-
risdiction over this Indian tribe because of its "unique" history. Such a
conclusion is a continuing adherence to judicial error. Questions of
jurisdiction and taxation--the most troublesome questions in Indian
country-should be answered in favor of the Cherokees just as they are
answered in favor of other Indian tribes in other states.
In the area of Indian affairs, Congress never has delegated to
North Carolina any special or unique powers over this tribe of Indians.
Unlike most of the twenty-six states with Indian populations, North
Carolina can point to no federal legislation granting it jurisdiction or
authority over the Cherokees since the federal government clearly as-
sumed trust responsibilities over the tribe.
It is difficult to believe that the federal courts will permit this situa-
tion to continue. As a matter of policy, laws regulating the affairs of
Indian reservations must come from Congress and the Department of
the Interior by virtue of the Indian- Commerce Clause and the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Indian law is a
national law, and federal Indian policy cannot be carried out if an indi-
vidual state is permitted to create exceptions based upon a self-serving
historical interpretation of the legal status of a particular Indian tribe.
435. See, e.g., Sasser v. Beck, 40 N.C. App. 668, 253 S.E.2d 577, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 300,259
S.E.2d 915 (1979).
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Federal Indian policy has encountered serious problems over the years,
but if individual states are permitted to create their own separate body
of Indian law, Indian affairs will be in complete chaos. The Supreme
Court noted as early as 1886 that Indian affairs have always been the
sole concern of the federal government and that only the federal gov-
ernment can apply a uniform policy and set of laws to all Indian
tribes.436 The North Carolina Cherokee cases represent an improper
judicial incursion in an area of traditionally federal concern by a single
state without any action by Congress.
436. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
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